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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
TWO-BIT PATTERN ANALYSIS FOR QUANTITATIVE INFORMATION
FLOW
by
Ziyuan Meng
Florida International University, 2014
Miami, Florida
Professor Geoffrey Smith, Major Professor
Protecting confidential information from improper disclosure is a fundamental
security goal. While encryption and access control are important tools for ensuring
confidentiality, they cannot prevent an authorized system from leaking confidential
information to its publicly observable outputs, whether inadvertently or maliciously.
Hence, secure information flow aims to provide end-to-end control of information
flow. Unfortunately, the traditionally-adopted policy of noninterference, which for-
bids all improper leakage, is often too restrictive. Theories of quantitative informa-
tion flow address this issue by quantifying the amount of confidential information
leaked by a system, with the goal of showing that it is intuitively “small” enough
to be tolerated. Given such a theory, it is crucial to develop automated techniques
for calculating the leakage in a system.
This dissertation is concerned with program analysis for calculating the maxi-
mum leakage, or capacity, of confidential information in the context of deterministic
systems and under three proposed entropy measures of information leakage: Shan-
non entropy leakage, min-entropy leakage, and g-leakage. In this context, it turns
out that calculating the maximum leakage of a program reduces to counting the
number of possible outputs that it can produce.
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The new approach introduced in this dissertation is to determine two-bit pat-
terns, the relationships among pairs of bits in the output; for instance we might
determine that two bits must be unequal. By counting the number of solutions to
the two-bit patterns, we obtain an upper bound on the number of possible outputs.
Hence, the maximum leakage can be bounded. We first describe a straightforward
computation of the two-bit patterns using an automated prover. We then show a
more efficient implementation that uses an implication graph to represent the two-
bit patterns. It efficiently constructs the graph through the use of an automated
prover, random executions, STP counterexamples, and deductive closure. The ef-
fectiveness of our techniques, both in terms of efficiency and accuracy, is shown
through a number of case studies found in recent literature.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation
With mobile devices and networking technology becoming more widespread, com-
puting systems process more confidential information than ever. Users would like
to know whether this information has been leaked to other undesirable users. Tra-
ditional approaches to information security, such as access control and encryption,
cannot guarantee control over the way in which this confidential information is dis-
tributed/propagated. For instance, an Android download can claim to respect the
system’s permission management, yet secretly send sensitive information to the net-
work after it is authorized. Similarly, encryption can ensure that only the endpoints
of a communication channel have access to the secret information. However, it
cannot stop the receiver from improperly distributing the decrypted data.
The concept of secure information flow aims to provide an end-to-end mechanism
to control the flow of information, and therefore, protect the confidential data.
Unfortunately, the traditionally-adopted policy of non-interference, which forbids
all improper leakage, is often unrealistic in many application senarios. There are
two main reasons for this. First, in some applications, leakage is an intrinsic part of
their functionalities. For instance, an ATM machine that rejects an incorrect PIN,
thereby reveals that the secret PIN differs from the one that was entered. Similarly,
publishing the tally of votes in an election manifests some information about the
secret ballots that were cast. Another more subtle reason of leakage is the side
channel. For instance, the amount of time taken by a cryptographic operation may
be observable by an adversary and may inadvertently reveal information about the
secret key. As a result, the last decade has seen growing interest in quantitative
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theories of information flow, which address this problem by quantifying the amount
of confidential information leaked by a system, with the goal of showing that it is
“small” enough to be tolerated [CHM05, CMS05, KB07, Smi09, AAP10, HSP10].
Given such a theory, it is crucial to develop automatic techniques for calculating
or estimating the amount of leakage in a system, in order to verify whether it
conforms to a given quantitative flow policy. This is an area that is now seeing
a great deal of work, both in the context of deterministic imperative programs
[BKR09, KR10, NMS09, HM10] and probabilistic systems [APvRS10, CCG10], and
utilizing both model checking and statistical sampling techniques.
To give some quick intuition, assume (as we will throughout this dissertation)
that X and Y are 32-bit unsigned integers, where X is the secret input and Y is the
observable output. Consider the following three C programs:
1. Y = X;,
2. Y = 17;,
3. Y = X & 0x1f;
Intuitively, it seems clear that the leakage of these three programs should be 32, 0,
and 5 bits, respectively. Notice that these quantities are the logarithms (to base 2)
of the number of feasible values for Y, which is 232, 1, and 25, respectively.
1.2 Contributions
The major contribution in this dissertation is to introduce and explore the use of
what we call two-bit patterns to calculate upper bounds on the maximum amount of
leakage in deterministic imperative programs under Shannon entropy , min-entropy ,
and the recently proposed g-entropy . Min-entropy leakage and g-entropy leakage
2
are alternatives to the more commonly-used measure based on Shannon entropy
and mutual information. In Chapter 2, we review these theories and motivations
in the context of security. For now, it suffices to know that the capacity (i.e. their
maximum leakage over all prior distributions on the secret input) of deterministic
systems, whether measured by Shannon entropy or min-entropy, is the logarithm of
the number of feasible outputs. And this quantity is also an upper bound on the
g-leakage, for any gain function g [Smi09, BCP09, ACPS12].
Thus, the problem can be reduced to calculate the number of feasible outputs
that a deterministic program can produce. Our approach to bounding this quantity
is to determine two-bit patterns among the bits of the feasible outputs. The key
idea is to bound the number of feasible outputs by determining one-bit patterns
that constrain each individual bit and two-bit patterns that constrain each pair of
bits in the output. For example, suppose that the program has 6 feasible outputs:
{00010, 10001, 00001, 00110, 10101, 00101}
where we index the 5 bit positions from 4 down to 0. Studying these outputs, we
notice that bit 3 is fixed—it is 0 in every output, which we express as Zero(3). In
contrast, bits 4, 2, 1, and 0 can each be 0 or 1, and we refer to them as Non-fixed.
Notice that it is only the non-fixed bits that give rise to multiple outputs; here the
fact that there are 4 non-fixed bits tells us immediately that there can be at most
24 = 16 feasible outputs.
We can tighten this bound by considering the relationship between each pair of
non-fixed bits. For instance, if we examine bits 4 and 0, we see that the possible
combinations of values that they can take are {00, 11, 01}, which we express as
Leq(4, 0). Bits 4 and 2, in contrast, can take all four combinations {00, 10, 01, 11},
which we express as Free(4, 2). The complete two-bit patterns for this example are
3
Zero(3)

4 2 1 0
4 Eq Free Nand Leq
2 Free Eq Free Free
1 Nand Free Eq Neq
0 Geq Free Neq Eq

Figure 1.1: Two-bit patterns for {00010, 10001, 00001, 00110, 10101, 00101}
shown in Figure 1.1. Two-bit patterns represent constraints that must be satisfied
by the bits of each feasible output. If we count the number of solutions to the two-
bit patterns, we get an upper bound on the number of feasible outputs. In this case,
it turns out that there are just 6 solutions, meaning that here our upper bound is
exact.
For a small program, the two-bit patterns of its output could be calculated by
using STP solver, an automated theorem prover. Consider the C-like programs that
take as input a secret value X and produce an output Y, where we assume that all
variables are 32-bit unsigned integers. The idea of two-bit patterns is to determine,
for every pair (i, j) of bit positions,1 which of the four combinations (0, 0), (0, 1),
(1, 0), and (1, 1) are possible values for bits i and j of Y. As an example, consider
the following program, adapted from [NMS09]:
Y = ((X >> 16) ^ X) & 0xffff;
Y = Y | Y << 16;
This program can be translated into the following STP assertions, where the symbol
Y1 denotes the intermediate value of variable Y:
X : BITVECTOR(32);
Y1, Y : BITVECTOR(32);
1We number the bits from 0 to 31, right to left.
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ASSERT(Y1 = BVXOR((X >> 16), X) & 0hex0000ffff);
ASSERT(Y = Y1 | (Y1 << 16));
Then the bit-patterns for Y is determined by making STP queries, which ask whether
a given property (e.g., “Y[3] = Y[19]”) is a logical consequence of the ASSERT
statements. We use one or two STP queries to determine each one-bit pattern,
and then use a decision tree of at most four STP queries to determine the two-bit
pattern among each pair of non-fixed bits. In this case, there are 32 · 31/2 = 496
two-bit patterns on Y; the only interesting patterns are that bits i and i + 16 must
be equal, for 0 ≤ i ≤ 15. That is, bits i and i + 16 can be (0, 0) or (1, 1), but not
(0, 1) or (1, 0). If we count the number of solutions to the two-bit patterns by using
the SatisfiabilityCount function of Mathematica, we get an upper bound on the
number of possible values of Y. Here there are 216 solutions to the two-bit patterns,
giving a maximum leakage of at most log 216 = 16 bits, which is exact in this case.
Notice that two-bit patterns subsume one-bit patterns, which classify each bit as
0, 1, or non-fixed. For example, if we know that bits i and j cannot be (0, 0) or (0, 1),
then we know that bit i must be 1. But one-bit patterns are clearly inadequate for
estimating leakage, as seen by an example like:
if (X % 2 == 0)
Y = 0;
else
Y = 0xffffffff;
in which all 32 bits of Y are non-fixed, even though Y has only two possible values.
Another contribution in this dissertation is the representation of two-bit patterns
as a directed implication graph. Nodes represent bits or the negations of bits, and
edges represent logical implication. Such representation not only provides a coher-
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ent mathematical representation of two-bit patterns, but also facilitates many new
techniques to improve the efficiency of two-bit pattern computation. We include
three optimization techniques in this dissertation:
1. random execution: Random execution of the program can fill in many entries
in the adjacency matrix of the implication graph without using STP queries.
2. STP counterexamples: When a STP query returns invalid, STP can give a
counterexample showing why the query is invalid. This gives a new, and
probably rare, feasible output. This output may well reveal some interesting
bit patterns, which we have not seen before. Thus, it cheaply fills in many
additional entries in the adjacency matrix.
3. deductive closure: Given a partially known adjacency matrix, we can fill in
additional entries whose value is a logical consequence of the entries already
known.
Portions of this dissertation are based on work previously published on ACM
SIGPLAN 2011 Workshop on Programming Languages and Analysis for Security
(PLAS) [MS11] , which introduced the concept of two-bit pattern analysis and de-
scribed a straightforward algorithm to compute the two-bit patterns of the output
for a given deterministic program, and 2013 International Workshop on Quantita-
tive Aspects in Security Assurance (QASA) [MS13], which introduced a coherent
representation of two-bit patterns as implication graphs and described an optimized
algorithm to speed up the two-bit pattern computing. My specific contributions
include proposing the original idea of using bit-level constraints to characterize the
feasible outputs, building the implementation, and conducting the experiments on
the collected case studies.
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1.3 Organization
The rest of the dissertation is structured as follows. In Chapter 2, we begin by
reviewing the theories of Shannon entropy, min-entropy and g-entropy measure of
leakage that we use in this work. In Chapter 3, we explain the concept of two-bit
patterns in detail using an illustrative example. In Chapter 4, we explore several
optimized techniques to speed up the two-bit pattern analysis. In Chapter 5, we
present the results achieved by our techniques on a number of case studies drawn
from the recent literature in quantitative information flow analysis. In Chapter 6,
we discuss related work and compare it with our approach. Finally, in Chapter 7,
we discuss future directions and conclude.
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CHAPTER 2
PRELIMINARIES
This chapter introduces the mathematical foundations of quantitative informa-
tion flow analysis, recalling important concepts of information theory [Sha48, Fel68,
Gal68, Mac03, CT06] and their measure of information leakage. These concepts
include the classical mutual information measure of leakage, min-entropy measure
of leakage proposed in [Smi09], and g-leakage proposed in [ACPS12].
2.1 Information Channel
An information theoretic channel offers a very general setting for theories of quanti-
tative information flow. Channels do not rely on any explicit notion of “messages”;
instead they capture relationships between system inputs and outputs through a
channel matrix . A channel matrix gives the conditional probability of each possible
output, given each possible input. Here “outputs” can be any subtle aspect of the
system’s behavior that is observable to an adversary. For instance, the amount of
time taken by a cryptographic operation may be observable by an adversary, and
may reveal information about the secret key.
Formally, a channel is a triple (X ,Y , C), where X is a finite set of secret input
values, Y is a finite set of observable output values, and C is an |X | × |Y| matrix,
called the channel matrix, such that C[x, y] = p(y|x), the conditional probability of
obtaining output y given that the input is x. Note that each row of C sums to 1.
An important special case is a deterministic channel, in which each input produces
a unique output. In terms of C, this means that each entry is either 0 or 1, and
each row contains exactly one 1.
Any a priori distribution pi on X determines a random variable X. By pi and
C, the joint probability pXY on X × Y can be determined:
8
p(x, y) = pi[x]C[x, y]
It can be shown that pXY contains all information needed to determine a marginal
distribution for Y :
p(y) =
∑
x∈X p(x, y)
and to reconstruct the marginal distribution for X:
p(x) =
∑
y∈Y p(x, y) = pi[x]
Hence the conditional probabilities in C can also be reconstructed from pXY :
p(y|x) = p(x,y)
p(x)
= C[x, y]
provided that p(x) is nonzero.
We are interested in quantifying the amount of information that flows from X
to Y by considering an adversary A, who knows both C and pi, wishes to guess the
value of X by observing Y ’s value after the execution of C. It is, therefore, natural
to measure information leakage by comparing A’s “uncertainty” about X before
and after seeing the value of Y , using the equation
leakage = initial uncertainty – remaining uncertainty.
2.2 Measuring Leakage using Mutual Information
Until recently, most works on quantitative information flow (for example, [CPP08]
and [Mal07]) have defined “uncertainty” using Shannon entropy and conditional
Shannon entropy [Sha48]:
H(pi) = −
∑
x∈X
pi[x] log pi[x]
9
and
H(pi,C) =
∑
y∈Y
p(y)H(pX|y),
which leads to defining leakage as mutual information:
leakage = H(pi)−H(pi,C) = I(pi,C).
A critical question about any leakage measure, however, is whether it gives good
operational security guarantees. In particular, we would like to know whether the
measure of remaining uncertainty accurately reflects the threat to X, given Y . For
H(pi,C), Massey’s guessing entropy bound [Mas94] shows thatG(pi,C), the expected
number of guesses required to guess X given Y , grows exponentially with H(pi,C).
A weakness of this bound, however, is that G(pi,C) can be arbitrarily high , even
when X is highly vulnerable to being guessed in one try. A key example from
[Smi09] illustrates this. Consider the program:
if (X % 8 == 0)
Y = X;
else
Y = 1;
(2.1)
where X is a uniformly-distributed 64-bit unsigned integer, 0 ≤ X < 264, so that
the initial uncertainty H(pi) = 64. Using the symmetric property of the mutual
information and the fact that H(Y |X) = 0 in deterministic programs, the mutual
10
information leakage of this program can be easily calculated
I(pi,Ex2.1) = I(Y,X)
= H(Y )−H(Y |X)
= H(Y )
=
∑
y∈Y
p(y) log
1
p(y)
= 2612−64 log 264 +
7
8
log
8
7
≈ 8.17
which means that the remaining uncertainty H(pi,C) ≈ 55.83. Here the adversary
A’s expected probability of guessing X in one try exceeds 1/8, since X is leaked com-
pletely whenever Y 6= 1. Nevertheless, the guessing entropy is high, since nothing
is leaked when Y = 1 (except the fact that the last three bits are not all 0):
G(pi,Ex2.1) =
1
8
· 1 + 7
8
· 1
2
· (7
8
264 + 1) ≈ 262.6.
It is instructive to compare program (2.1) with
Y = X & 0777; (2.2)
which simply copies the 9 bits of X into Y . The mutual information leakage of
program (2.2) is 9, making it worse than program (2.1), even though it gives A a
probability of guessing X in one try of only 2−55, since the first 55 bits of X remain
completely unknown.
2.3 Measuring Leakage using Min-entropy
In view of the unsatisfactory security guarantees given by mutual information leak-
age, it was proposed in [Smi09] to define “uncertainty” in terms of the vulnerability
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of X to being guessed correctly in one try by A. Again, we make the assumption
that A knows pi and C, then the a priori vulnerability is
V (pi) = max
x∈X
pi[x]
and the a posteriori vulnerability is
V (pi,C) =
∑
y∈Y
p(y) max
x∈X
p(x|y)
=
∑
y∈Y
max
x∈X
p(x, y)
=
∑
y∈Y
max
x∈X
pi[x]C[x, y].
We convert from vulnerability to uncertainty by taking the negative logarithm,
giving Re´nyi’s min-entropy [R6´1]. Our definitions, then, are
• initial uncertainty: H∞(pi) = − log V (pi)
• remaining uncertainty: H∞(pi,C) = − log V (pi,C)
Finally, we define the min-entropy leakage from X to Y via C, denoted L(pi,C), to
be
L(pi,C) = H∞(pi)−H∞(pi,C)
= − log V (pi)− (− log V (pi,C))
= log
V (pi,C)
V (pi)
.
Thus, min-entropy leakage is the logarithm of the factor by which knowledge of Y
increases the expected one-guess vulnerability of X. Using this new definition of
leakage to re-evaluate program (2.1), we find that its min-entropy leakage is 61.00,
reflecting the fact that V (pi,C) ≈ 1/8. In contrast, for program (2.2) the min-
entropy leakage is 9, reflecting the fact that V (pi,C) = 2−55.
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Min-entropy leakage is a step toward measuring information leakage with opera-
tional significances. However, there still exist scenarios where leakage measured by
min-entropy can be misleading. One such situation is where A is allowed to make
multiple guesses. To illustrate, comparing the program (2.1) with the following
example from [Smi09]:
Y = X | 07; (2.3)
Again, we assume that X, Y are 64-bit unsigned integers and X is uniformly dis-
tributed. Both programs have 61.000 bits min-entropy leakage. However, they
present different threats in the 8-guess scenario. A can determine X within 8 guesses
after observing the value of Y produced by program (2.3), while program (2.1) offers
A almost no clue about X seven-eighths of the time. Another scenario indicating the
limitation of min-entropy leakage is the case where A is only interested in guessing
the secret partially or approximately. An example from [ACPS12] illustrates this.
Consider a probabilistic channel which takes a secret array X containing 10-bit,
uniformly-distributed passwords for 1000 users and produces one randomly-chosen
user’s password along with his/her index:
u
?←− {0...999};
Y = (u,X[u]);
(2.4)
If we take all the users’ passwords as a whole, then the channel’s prior vulnerabil-
ity is 2−10000 and its posterior vulnerability is 2−9990. Thus, the leakage measured by
min-entropy is 10 bits. If we focus on the threat to any particular user i’s password,
then the prior vulnerability becomes 2−10 and the posterior vulnerability becomes
0.001 · 1 + 0.999 · 2−10 ≈ 0.00198, since in one time out of a thousand, A learns user
i’s password but knows nothing about it the rest of the time. Thus, the leakage of
this “sub-channel” measured by min-entropy is log 2.023 ≈ 1.016 bits out of 10 bits.
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In either circumstance, min-entropy leakage fails to reflect the real danger in this
example: some user’s password is always publicized.
2.4 Measuring Leakage using Gain Functions and g-leakage
To overcome its limitation and to model the threats in a wide variety of scenarios,
min-entropy is generalized using the notion of gain function [ACPS12]. The key idea
is that for each guess w whichA could make about the secret, there is a value between
0 and 1 quantifying the benefit which he/she gains when the secret is actually x.
Different operational scenarios can be expressed by carefully designed gain functions.
Formally, given a set W of guesses and a set X of secrets, a gain function g is a
function: W×X → [0, 1]. Then a generalization of the prior vulnerability is defined
as:
Vg(pi) = max
w∈W
∑
x∈X
pi[x]g(w, x)
The rationale of the definition is that adversary A makes a guess w that maximizes
the expected gain over X . The generalization of the posterior vulnerability is defined
in a similar way:
Vg(pi,C) =
∑
y∈Y
max
w∈W
∑
x∈X
pi[x]C[x, y]g(w, x)
=
∑
y∈Y
max
w∈W
∑
x∈X
p(x, y)g(w, x)
=
∑
y∈Y
p(y)Vg(pX|y)
The definitions of g-entropy and g-leakage are similar to the definitions of min-
entropy and min-leakage:
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Hg(pi) = − log Vg(pi)
Hg(pi,C) = − log Vg(pi,C)
Lg(pi,C) = Hg(pi)−Hg(pi,C) = log Vg(pi,C)
Vg(pi)
This section is concluded by introducing several gain function examples from
[ACPS12], which illustrate how gain functions allow a wide range of scenarios to be
expressed. A very simple gain function is the identity gain function gid : X ×X →
[0, 1]. It describes an operational scenario when A only benefits from guessing the
entire secret correctly. Formally, it is defined as:
gid(w, x) =

1, if w = x
0, if w 6= x
[ACPS12] shows that ordinary vulnerability is a special case of g-vulnerability.
Proposition 2.4.1 Vulnerability under gid coincides with vulnerability:
Vgid(pi) = V (pi)
Proof. For any w,
∑
x pi[x]gid(w, x) = pi[w]. So Vgid(pi) = maxw pi[w] = V (pi).
This implies that gid-leakage also coincides with min-entropy leakage.
To specify the scenario where A can make 3 guesses to find the secret, 3-tries
gain function is crafted where W ∈ 2X and |W | = 3:
g3(W,x) =

1, if x ∈ W
0, otherwise.
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The gain function g3 helps distinguish program (2.1) from program (2.3). Recall
that both programs have min-entropy leakage of 61 bits when X is a uniformly-
distributed 64-bit unsigned integer. Their leakages measured by g3 are quite dif-
ferent. In program (2.3), both the prior vulnerability and the poster vulnerability
increase by a factor of 3 due to the 3 tries. Hence, Lg3(pi,Ex2.3) remains the same.
Program (2.1)’s posterior vulnerability doesn’t increase very much under g3:
Vg3(pi,Ex2.1) =
1
8
· 1 + 7
8
· 3 · 2−64 ≈ 1
8
Hence, Lg3(pi,Ex2.1) is reduced to about 59.4 bits. However, in the scenario where
there is a penalty for wrong guesses (e.g., electrocution via keyboard) and A is
reluctant to guess, program (2.1) is actually worse. This is because A knows the
exact value of X whenever Y 6= 1.
To reflect the danger of program (2.4), adversary A is only interested in some
users’ password, we can design the following W and gain function g:
W = {(u, x)|0 ≤ u ≤ 999 and 0 ≤ x ≤ 1023}
g((u, x), X) =

1, if X[u] = x
0, otherwise.
Revisiting example (2.4), the prior vulnerability becomes 2−10 under g, since every
user’s password is uniformaly distributed and ranges from 0 to 1023. The posterior
vulnerability under g becomes 1, since for every observable output (u,X[u]), A can
always choose the guess accordingly to guarantee gain 1. Hence, the g-leakage under
g is 10 bits out of 10 bits. Comparing this result with the min-entropy leakage which
is 10 bits out of 10000 bits, leakage under g describes the threat more accurately.
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2.5 Channel Capacity
This section will discuss the channel capacity related properties of the entropy defi-
nitions introduced in the previous sections. Primarily, we focus on the capacities of
deterministic channels which are the objects of leakage analysis in this dissertation.
Channel capacity, the maximum leakage over all possible a priori distributions, is an
important notion in information theory. It provides a further abstract way of study-
ing a channel independent of any particular prior distribution and focuses on its
“worst-case” leakage. Throughout this dissertation, we will use the name Shannon
capacity refering to the capacity under mutual information, min-capacity with the
notationML(C) refering to the capacity under min-entropy leakage, and g-capacity
with the notation MLg(C) refering to the capacity under g-leakage.
In general, calculating the Shannon capacity of a channel matrix is difficult. But
as shown in [BCP09, KS10], calculating the min-capacity is straightforward. It is
simply the logarithm of the sum of the column maximums of C :
Theorem 2.5.1 For any channel matrix C,
ML(C) = log
∑
y∈Y
max
x∈X
C[x, y]
Proof.
L(pi,C) = log V (pi,C)
V (pi)
= log
∑
y∈Y maxx∈X (pi[x]C[x, y])
maxx∈X pi[x]
≤ log
∑
y∈Y maxx∈X C[x, y](maxx∈X pi[x])
maxx∈X pi[x]
= log
∑
y∈Y
max
x∈X
C[x, y]
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Notice that the min-capacity is always realized by a uniform distribution on X . As
a corollary, the min-capacity of a deterministic channel is just the logarithm of the
number of possible outputs. Interestingly, this is also its Shannon capacity [Smi09]:
Theorem 2.5.2 If C is deterministic, then its min-capacity and Shannon capac-
ity coincide, with both equal to log |Y| (assuming that every element of Y is really
possible).
Proof. Since C is a deterministic channel, each of its entry is either 0 or 1. And
there is at least one entry of 1 for each column since every element in Y is feasible.
By Theorem 2.5.1, the min-capacity of C is the logarithm of the sum of its column
maximums. Hence the min-capacity of C is just log |Y|.
Recall that the Shannon leakage of a deterministic channel is H(Y ). H(Y )
achieves its maximum value log |Y| when Y is uniformly distributed. This can
always be realized by some a prior distribution on X .
When it comes to g-capacity, there is miraculous order between g-capacity and
min-capacity: for every gain function g, min-capacity is an upper bound on g-
capacity [ACPS12]:
Theorem 2.5.3 For every channel C and gain function g, MLg(C) ≤ML(C).
Proof.
Vg(pi,C) =
∑
y∈Y
max
w∈W
∑
x∈X
C[x, y]pi[x]g(w, x)
≤
∑
y∈Y
max
w∈W
∑
x∈X
(max
x∈X
C[x, y])pi[x]g(w, x)
= (
∑
y∈Y
max
x∈X
C[x, y])(max
w∈W
∑
x∈X
pi[x]g(w, x)),
Applying Theorem 2.5.1, we have
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Vg(pi,C) ≤ 2ML(C)Vg(pi)
Hence,
Lg(pi,C) = log Vg(pi,C)
Vg(pi)
≤ML(C)
This implies that MLg(C) ≤ML(C).
From the theorems above, we have the following conclusion on the channel ca-
pacities of deterministic channels:
Corollary 2.5.4 The capacity of a deterministic system, whether measured by Shan-
non entropy or min-entropy, is the logarithm of the number of feasible outputs. This
quantity is also an upper bound on the g-leakage, for any gain function g.
Proof. Follows from Theorem 2.5.2 and Theorem 2.5.3.
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CHAPTER 3
TWO-BIT PATTERNS
Given any theory of quantitative information flow, it is desirable to develop auto-
matic techniques for calculating/bounding the amount of leakage in a system, to
verify whether it conforms to a given quantitative flow policy. As we have seen in
Corollary 2.5.4, in the context of deterministic systems, this task is reduced to cal-
culating/bounding the number of the feasible outputs. In this chapter, we introduce
the approach of two-bit patterns to calculate upper bounds on the channel capacity
of a deterministic C-like program. The chapter is based on our work previously pub-
lished at ACM SIGPLAN 2011 Workshop on Programming Languages and Analysis
for Security (PLAS) [MS11].
The approach can be divided into three major steps. The first step is to derive
the mathematical relationship between the initial values of the secret input variables
and final values of the output variables. The second step is to discover the one-bit
patterns that constrain each individual bit and the two-bit patterns that constrain
each pair of bits in the final values of the outputs. The third step is to use a
#SAT algorithm to count the number of instances that satisfy all the bit patterns
discovered in the second step; the logarithm of this number is our upper bound on
the channel capacity.
Throughout this chapter, we use the analysis of the program shown in Figure 3.1
to illustrate these three steps in detail. Assuming that X is the secret input variable,
X = X & 0x77777777;
if (X <= 64) Y = X; else Y = 0;
if (Y % 2 == 0) Y++;
Figure 3.1: Illustrative example program that leaks information from X to Y
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Y is the output variable, and both are 32-bit unsigned integers, the program can
produce 17 distinct outputs: 1, 3, 5, 7, 17, 19, 21, 23, 33, 35, 37, 39, 49, 51, 53, 55, 65.
3.1 Deriving Predicates
This step can be accomplished by generating a series of predicates which describe
the relationship between the value of variables before and after each computation
step. As in SSA (single static assignment) form, we represent the successive values
of each variable V by a sequence of symbols V0, V1, V2, etc. For each computation
step, a fresh symbol is introduced for each variable affected by the step; it represents
the value of the variable after the computation step. Then a predicate is derived to
describe the relationship between the new symbol and the previous symbols. For
example, the first assignment in the program in Figure 3.1 gives rise to the predicate
X1 = X0 & 0x77777777
Here the symbols X0 and X1 represent variable X’s value before and after the first
assignment. Since variable Y is not affected, no new symbol is introduced for it and
Y0 (variable O’s initial value) remains current.
The second and third commands in the example each require a conditional ex-
pression:
Y1 = if X1 <= 64 then X1 else 0
Y2 = if Y1 mod 2 = 0 then Y1+1 else O1
These three predicates implicitly constitute a symbolic description of Y’s final value
in terms of X’s initial value. Currently, the loops need to be unrolled completely to
get their SSA forms.
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X0, X1 : BITVECTOR(32);
Y1, Y2 : BITVECTOR(32);
ASSERT(X1 = X0 & 0hex77777777);
ASSERT(Y1 = IF (BVLE(X1, 0hex00000040))
THEN X1
ELSE 0hex00000000
ENDIF);
ASSERT(Y2 = IF (BVMOD(32, Y1, 0hex00000002) = 0hex00000000)
THEN BVPLUS(32, Y1, 0hex00000001)
ELSE Y1
ENDIF);
Figure 3.2: Translation of illustrative example into STP
Next, we translate the predicates that we have derived into the language of the
STP solver [GD07]. STP is an efficient decision procedure for testing validity (or
satisfiability) of predicates in quantifier-free first-order logic over bit-vectors and
arrays; it has been widely used by many program analysis research groups.
The translation is straightforward—each symbol (representing a 32-bit value) is
declared as a bit-vector, the operations in each predicate are replaced with STP
equivalents. For instance, the expression Y1 mod 2 translates into
BVMOD(32, Y1, 0hex00000002)
where BVMOD stands for “Bit-Vector Modulo” and the parameter 32 gives the word
size. Finally, each predicate is translated into an STP ASSERT statement. The
complete translation of the program in Figure 3.1 is shown in Figure 3.2.
So far, we do the translation to STP manually, leaving generalization and au-
tomation of the process to future work.
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3.2 Discovering One-Bit and Two-Bit Patterns
Now we wish to discover the relations (bit patterns) among the bits in Y2, which
is the final value of the output variable Y. We achieve this by making STP queries
with respect to the assertions generated in Step 1. In STP, QUERY(P) asks whether
predicate P is a logical consequence of the ASSERT statements that have been made.
If so, STP responds VALID; if not, it responds INVALID.
We start by determining the one-bit pattern for each bit of Y2. A one-bit pattern
describes the set of possible values for a particular bit. Since a bit is either 0 or 1,
there are three one-bit patterns: Zero, One, and Non-fixed, which means that it is
possible for the bit to be either 0 or 1. The STP query
QUERY(Y2[i:i] = 0bin0)
tests whether bit i of Y2 is necessarily 0, given the ASSERT statements that have
been made. If STP returns VALID, then we can conclude that the bit must be 0; if
it returns INVALID, then we know that the bit i can be 1. Similarly, the STP query
QUERY(Y2[i:i] = 0bin1)
tests whether bit i of Y2 is necessarily 1. If both queries return INVALID, then the
bit can be either 0 or 1.
Using more readable notation, if we denote the final output symbol with Yf , then
the algorithm to determine the one-bit pattern for bit i of Yf is
if (Yf [i] = 0) is valid then
Zero
else if (Yf [i] = 1) is valid then
One
else
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Non-fixed
end if
Notice that it requires one or two STP queries per bit.
On the example in Figure 3.1, as translated into Figure 3.2, STP discovers that
26 of the bits in Y2 have pattern Zero, namely, bits 31 down to 7, along with bit
3. Also, bit 0 has pattern One. The remaining 5 bits (bits 6, 5, 4, 2, and 1) have
pattern Non-fixed. The one-bit patterns can be displayed compactly in a vector,
using * to represent the bits with pattern Non-fixed:
0000000000000000000000000***0**1
Discovering these 32 one-bit patterns required a total of 38 STP queries and 1072
ms.1 Notice that we can immediately conclude that the number of possible values
for Y2 is at most 25 = 32, since it has only 5 non-fixed bits.
We can tighten our upper bound by next determining the two-bit pattern for
every pair of bits; notice that we need to do this only among the bits with the
pattern Non-fixed. A two-bit pattern describes the set of possible values that a pair
of bits can have. Hence the set of two-bit patterns is the powerset of the set of
two-bit values, minus the empty set. There are four possible values for a pair of
bits: {00, 01, 10, 11}. Hence the number of two-bit patterns is 24 − 1 = 15.
Here is the complete enumeration of the possible two-bit patterns:
1. {00}
2. {01}
3. {10}
4. {11}
1Throughout this paper, all times are given in milliseconds.
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5. {00, 01}
6. {00, 10}
7. {01, 11}
8. {10, 11}
9. {00, 11}
10. {01, 10}
11. {00, 01, 10}
12. {00, 01, 11}
13. {00, 10, 11}
14. {01, 10, 11}
15. {00, 01, 10, 11}
Notice, however, that the first eight patterns will never occur, since in each of them
at least one of the two bits is fixed. Therefore, we only need to consider the last
seven patterns (patterns 9 through 15). Interestingly, each of these seven patterns
can be interpreted as a binary relation:
• {00, 11} is the equality relation
• {01, 10} is the inequality relation
• {00, 01, 10} is the logical nand relation
• {00, 01, 11} is the ≤ relation
• {00, 10, 11} is the ≥ relation
• {01, 10, 11} is the logical or relation
• {00, 01, 10, 11} is the universal relation, saying that the two bits are indepen-
dent of each other.
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We will refer concisely to these seven patterns as Eq, Neq, Nand, Leq, Geq, Or, and
Free, respectively.
The two-bit patterns can be computed by a straightforward algorithm. It deter-
mines the two-bit patterns via a decision tree of queries. For instance,
QUERY(Y2[i:i] = 0bin0 OR Y2[j:j] = 0bin0)
returns VALID iff bits i and j cannot both be 1. Similarly,
QUERY(Y2[i:i] = 0bin1 OR Y2[j:j] = 0bin1)
returns VALID iff bits i and j cannot both be 0. So if both these queries return
VALID, then the pattern for bits i and j must be {01, 10}, or Neq. (Notice that
both 01 and 10 must be possible, because we find two-bit patterns only among bits
that are not fixed.)
Other two-bit patterns can be determined in a similar manner. The complete
algorithm is shown in Figure 3.3. Notice that under this algorithm, 2 STP queries
are required to determine the Neq and Nand patterns, 3 STP queries are required
to determine the Eq, Geq, and Leq patterns, and 4 STP queries are required to
determine the Or and Free patterns. Hence, if the output Yf contains m non-
fixed bits, then at most 2m(m− 1) STP queries suffice to determine all the two-bit
patterns.
On the program in Figure 3.1, it turns out that there are four interesting two-bit
patterns among the 5 non-fixed bits of Y2, namely Nand(6,1), Nand(6,2), Nand(6,4),
and Nand(6,5). All other pairs of non-fixed bits are Free. Finding these two-bit
patterns required a total of 32 STP queries and 2558 ms.
We remark that the average time per STP query for the illustrative example
is about 41 ms for the one-bit pattern queries, and 80 ms for the two-bit pattern
queries. These times are unusually high, compared with the times for the other case
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for all non-fixed bits i and j such that i > j do
if (Yf [i] = 0 ∨ Yf [j] = 0) is valid then
if (Yf [i] = 1 ∨ Yf [j] = 1) is valid then
Neq(i, j)
else
Nand(i, j)
end if
else if (Yf [i] ≥ Yf [j]) is valid then
if (Yf [i] ≤ Yf [j]) is valid then
Eq(i, j)
else
Geq(i, j)
end if
else if (Yf [i] ≤ Yf [j]) is valid then
Leq(i, j)
else if (Yf [i] = 1 ∨ Yf [j] = 1) is valid then
Or(i, j)
else
Free(i, j)
end if
end for
Figure 3.3: Algorithm to determine two-bit patterns for
Yf
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studies by the same straightforward approach in Chapter 5. The cause turns out to
be the use here of the expensive BVMOD operation. If we rewrite the last line of the
illustrative example from
if (Y % 2 == 0) Y++;
to the equivalent
if (Y & 0x00000001 == 0) Y++;
we find that the cost per STP query drops to under 2 ms.
3.3 Counting the Number of Solutions
Finally, we determine an upper bound on the number of possible outputs by counting
the number of solutions to the two-bit patterns. We do this using the SatisfiabilityCount
function provided by Mathematica.2 Given a boolean proposition P and a list of
boolean variables b1, b2, . . . , the Mathematica call
SatisfiabilityCount[P, {b1, b2, . . .}]
returns the number of truth assignments to b1, b2, . . . that make P true. (Notice
that if some bi does not occur in P , then it can be freely set to true or false without
affecting the truth of P .)
We call SatisfiabilityCount with a boolean proposition formed from the two-
bit patterns (other than Free) discovered in Step 2, together with a list of all the
non-fixed bits of the output. In the case of the program in Figure 3.1, we make the
call
2http://www.wolfram.com/mathematica/
28
In[1] = SatisfiabilityCount[Nand[b6,b1] &&
Nand[b6,b2] &&
Nand[b6,b4] &&
Nand[b6,b5],
{b6,b5,b4,b2,b1}]
which produces the result
Out[1] = 17
in less than 1 ms. It is straightforward to see that this result is an upper bound on
the number of outputs that can be produced by the program; in this example, it
turns out to be exactly correct. It implies a min-capacity of at most log 17 ≈ 4.087
bits.
From a theoretical perspective, it is interesting to note that the proposition
P that we construct from the two-bit patterns can easily be put into 2CNF (2
conjunctive normal form). For example, if bits a and b have pattern Eq, then they
cannot be 01 or 10, giving
¬(a¯b+ ab¯) ≡ (a+ b¯)(a¯+ b).
While testing satisfiability of propositions in 2CNF can be done in linear time, it
turns out that counting the number of satisfying assignments is still #P-complete
[Val79]. Nevertheless, our experiments have been encouraging with respect to the
feasibility of this approach—in all cases, we found that SatisfiabilityCount took
a negligible amount of time compared with the time to find the bit patterns.
We have performed the two-bit pattern computing for the aforementioned illus-
trative example on a Lenovo B570 computer with a 2.3 GHz Intel Core i3-2310M
processor and 3GB of DDR3 RAM. The machine runs Ubuntu 12.04 Linux operat-
ing system. We have implemented the two-bit pattern computing algorithm using
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OpenJDK for Java 6 and Java binding for the STP decision procedure. We used the
SatisfiabilityCount function in Mathematica 9 to count the number of solutions
for the two-bit patterns. Under this environment, our approach takes less than 3
seconds to find an upper bound (17) on the number of possible outputs, and here it
turns out to be exact.
One might wonder how these results compare with a more brute-force approach
to counting the number of possible outputs. Specifically, we can test whether any
32-bit value v is a possible output using the STP query
QUERY(NOT(Y2[0:31] = v))
which returns INVALID iff v is a possible output. If we try this query on all 232
values of v, from 0x00000000 to 0xffffffff, then we will know exactly how many
outputs are possible. However, experiments under the environment described above
show that on average each of these queries takes 20 ms, which implies that it would
take 2.7 years to complete the 232 queries.
Another approach to counting the number of possible outputs is exhaustive test-
ing. We can execute the program on each 32-bit value of X and count how many
distinct values Y may obtain. Experiments (again under the environment described
above) show that on average each execution takes 0.1 ms, which implies that it
would take about 5 days to complete all 232 executions. 3
3Additional time would be required to count the number of distinct values produced.
We have not implemented such a procedure.
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CHAPTER 4
OPTIMIZATION
In this chapter, we introduce an efficient approach to compute two-bit patterns.
The chapter is based on our work previously published at 2013 International Work-
shop on Quantitative Aspects in Security Assurance (QASA) [MS13]. The approach
is based on four techniques: implication graph, random execution, STP counterex-
amples and deductive closure. We first show that the two-bit patterns can be repre-
sented as a directed implication graph, as used in the study of the 2SAT problem.
Nodes represent bits or the negations of bits, and edges represent logical implica-
tion. Then, we show that random execution of the program can cheaply produce
feasible outputs, which allow us to fill in many entries of the adjacency matrix rep-
resentation of the implication graph without using STP queries. Moreover, STP
counterexamples is a feature of STP solver. It gives a counter example to explain
why a query returns invalid, and thus allows us to fill in many additional entries
of the adjacency matrix. Finally, given a partially known adjacency matrix, we
can perform deductive closure to fill in additional entries whose value is a logical
consequence of the entries already known.
We combine these techniques into a single algorithm. As a re-evaluation on
the illustrative example in Figure 3.1 shows, this optimized approach enables us to
significantly reduce the time required for two-bit pattern analysis. More case studies
on the effectiveness of this approach are presented in the next chapter.
4.1 Formal Framework
This section explores the mathematical aspects of the two-bit patterns: implication
graph representations, and their relationship with concrete states. The set of feasible
outputs of a program can be modeled as a set R of states ρ. The bits in a state
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are indexed by a set I of indices. (For example, for the 5-bit states modeled in
Figure 1.1, we would have I = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}.) Formally, a state ρ is a mapping:
ρ : I → B, where B = {0, 1}.
4.1.1 Implication Graphs
Recall that the seven possible two-bit patterns among a pair of non-fixed bits, Eq,
Neq, Nand, Leq, Geq, Or, and Free, can be encoded as 2CNFs. Since implication and
negation are logically complete, each CNF can be expressed in terms of implications
over literals, which are indices or negated indices:
Two-Bit Pattern Implications
Eq(i, j) i→ j, j¯ → i¯, j → i, i¯→ j¯
Neq(i, j) i→ j¯, j → i¯, i¯→ j, j¯ → i
Nand(i, j) i→ j¯, j → i¯
Leq(i, j) i→ j, j¯ → i¯
Geq(i, j) j → i, i¯→ j¯
Or(i, j) i¯→ j, j¯ → i
(Notice that Free(i, j) does not result in any implications.)
This translation enables us to represent a set of two-bit patterns as a directed
graph whose nodes are literals and whose edges represent implication; such graphs
are known as implication graphs in the study of the 2SAT problem [Kro67, APT79].
As an example, Figure 4.1 shows the implication graph, in both graphical and ad-
jacency matrix representations, corresponding to the two-bit patterns in Figure 1.1.
(To avoid clutter, we omit self-loops in the graphical representation.) Implication
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44¯
1¯
1
0
0¯
2
2¯

4 2 1 0 4¯ 2¯ 1¯ 0¯
4 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
4¯ 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
2¯ 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
1¯ 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
0¯ 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1

Figure 4.1: The implication graph for {00010, 10001, 00001, 00110, 10101, 00101}
graphs have the property of being skew-symmetric [GK96], since there is an edge
from i to j iff there is an edge from j¯ to i¯.
The implication graph in Figure 4.1 omits mention of the fixed bit 3, since
fixed bits do not contribute to multiple outputs. But the one-bit patterns can
be incorporated into the implication graph. For example, the implication 3 → 3¯
expresses that bit 3 must be 0.
4.1.2 Semantic Characterization
To establish the correctness of our two-bit pattern analysis, we need a semantic
characterization of implication graphs (represented as adjacency matrices). To use
the language of abstract interpretation [CC04], we want to see implication graphs as
an abstract domain for the concrete domain of sets of states.
To facilitate this connection, we define literals Iˆ = I ∪ {¯i | i ∈ I}. We, moreover,
extend states to Iˆ by specifying that ρ(¯i) = ρ(i). Notice then that an implication
i→ j holds in state ρ iff ρ(i) ≤ ρ(j).
Now, we define our abstraction function α that maps a set R of states to an
implication graph M :
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Definition 4.1.1 Abstraction function α : P(Iˆ → B)→ (Iˆ × Iˆ → B) is given by
α(R)ij =
 1, if for all ρ ∈ R, ρ(i) ≤ ρ(j)0, otherwise.
Next, we define the concretization function γ that maps an implication graph M
to a set R of states:
Definition 4.1.2 Concretization function γ : (Iˆ × Iˆ → B)→ P(Iˆ → B) is given by
γ(M) = {ρ | for all i, j, if Mij = 1 then ρ(i) ≤ ρ(j)}
(Note that 0s in M do not constrain the states.)
The key correctness property of the implication graph domain is given by the
following theorem, which ensures that when we calculate implication graph M =
α(R), where R is the set of feasible states, then we know that γ(M) is a superset of
R, implying that we over-approximate the set of feasible states.
Theorem 4.1.3 Given any set R of states, R ⊆ γ(α(R)).
Proof. Let M = α(R). We need to prove that ρ ∈ R⇒ ρ ∈ γ(M). By the definition
of α, ∀i, j, if Mij = 1 then ρ(i) ≤ ρ(j) since ρ ∈ R. By the definition of γ, this
means that ρ ∈ γ(M).
Note, however, that the relationships specified in an arbitrary implication graph
M may be incoherent; for instance, we might have Mij = 1 and Mjk = 1, but
Mik = 0. Hence, we have the following definition.
Definition 4.1.4 Implication graph M is coherent if there exists a set R such that
M = α(R).
Coherent implication graphs behave well with respect to γ and α:
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Theorem 4.1.5 If M is coherent, then α(γ(M)) = M .
Proof. Let M = α(R) and α(γ(M)) = N where R is a nonempty set of states. ∀i, j,
if Mij = 1 then ∀ρ ∈ γ(M), ρ(i) ≤ ρ(j) by the definition of γ. Hence, Nij = 1 by
the definition of α. ∀i, j, if Mij = 0 then ∃ρ ∈ R, ρ(i) > ρ(j) by the definition of α.
By Theorem 4.1.3, ρ ∈ γ(M). Hence, Nij = 0 by the definition of α. Therefore, M
is identical to N .
4.2 One-bit Patterns, Random Execution, and STP Coun-
terexamples
As was shown in Figure 4.1, we include only the non-fixed bits in the implication
graph. This means that computing the implication graph for the set R of feasible
outputs of a given program still has to begin by determining the one-bit patterns.
For each bit i of output Y, we use the same one-bit pattern queries as in the straight-
forward approach in Chapter 3 to determine whether it is Zero, One or Non-fixed.
Also, only the Non-fixed bits in Iˆ are included in the implication graph M .
In the hope of avoiding the need for so many STP queries, however, we first
execute the program on a set of randomly-chosen inputs X. For each bit i of Y, these
random executions reveal at least one possible value, allowing us to determine its
one-bit pattern using just one STP query. If we are lucky, the random executions
may reveal that bit i can be both 0 and 1, allowing us to conclude that it is Non-fixed
without making any STP queries. (Of course, the likelihood of this will depend on
the probability distribution on Y, as many programs produce certain values of Y with
very low probability.) We found in our case studies that doing 40 random executions
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typically gets most of the possible benefit without costing very much, so that is the
number of random executions that we use in our implementation.
We can further improve efficiency by making use of STP counterexamples. If we
query “Y[i] = 0?” and STP returns invalid, then STP can give us, essentially for
free, a counterexample showing why the query is invalid. This gives us a new, and
probably rare, feasible output that we have not seen before. (Here it would be an
output where Y[i] = 1.) This output may well reveal that some other bits of Y are
Non-fixed, freeing us from the need to make queries about them.
4.3 Two-bit Patterns and Deductive Closure
Our goal is to determine the implication graph M using as few STP queries as
possible. To this end, it is useful to extend to partially-known implication graphs,
where we use ⊥ to denote unknown entries. Recall that we limit M to the non-fixed
bits of Iˆ, which is denoted by IˆN . Hence, formally, M : IˆN × IˆN → B⊥, where B⊥ is
the flat domain {0, 1,⊥} with partial order ⊥  0 and ⊥  1. We also extend  to
implication graphs M pointwise.
When we are calculating the implication graph M of a set R of feasible outputs,
our strategy will be to populate M with ⊥s initially, and to fill in entries so as to
preserve the key invariant M  α(R), which says that every 0 and 1 entry in M
accurately describes R.
The first entries that we can make in M are the trivial ones saying that, for all
literals i ∈ IˆN , Mii = 1 and Mi¯i = 0. (Mi¯i = 1 would imply that i is Zero.)
We can also fill in a large number of entries based on the random executions
and STP counterexamples described above. Suppose that we have found a feasible
output where bits i and j are 0 and 1, respectively. Then we can conclude that
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a b c
d

a b c d
a 1 1 ⊥ 1
b 0 1 1 0
c ⊥ 0 1 0
d 0 0 0 1

Figure 4.2: A partially-known implication graph
Mji = 0 and Mi¯j¯ = 0. Indeed, every combination of values for bits i and j allows
us to deduce two 0s in M . Hence, a single feasible output lets us fill in one fourth
of the nontrivial entries of M . (If there are n non-fixed bits, then M has 4n2 − 4n
nontrivial entries, and a feasible output lets us fill in n2 − n of them.) Additional
feasible outputs let us fill in a variable number of additional entries, depending on
the particular patterns of bits that they exhibit.
Each remaining entry of M could of course be filled in by an STP query, but we
can do better by taking advantage of the dependencies among the entries. Consider
the partially-known implication graph in Figure 4.2, where the dashed edges denote
edges whose existence/non-existence is unknown. If we consider the unknown edge
from a to c, we can easily deduce that it must exist, by transitivity. More interest-
ingly, we can also deduce that the unknown edge from c to a must not exist. For an
edge from c to a would by transitivity imply also an edge from c to d, contradicting
the known fact that there is no such edge.
Algorithm 1: DeductiveClosure1 algorithm
Input : implication graph M over non-fixed bits IˆN
Output: M with additional 1s implied by transitivity
for k ∈ IˆN do
for i ∈ IˆN do
for j ∈ IˆN do
if Mik = 1 ∧Mkj = 1 then
Mij ← 1;
37
Algorithm 2: DeductiveClosure2 algorithm
Input : transitive implication graph M over non-fixed bits IˆN
Output: M with additional 0s implied by transitivity
for k ∈ IˆN do
for i ∈ IˆN do
for j ∈ IˆN do
if (Mik = 0 ∧Mjk = 1) ∨ (Mki = 1 ∧Mkj = 0) then
Mij ← 0;
These insights lead to two algorithms for deductive closure. The first, shown in
Algorithm 1, is Warshall’s classic transitive closure algorithm. The second, shown in
Algorithm 2, takes as input a transitive implication graph M and deduces additional
0 entries. To get some intuition, notice that when the first disjunct of the if holds,
then we have i 6→ k and j → k. Hence, i → j is impossible, as this would yield
i→ k by transitivity.
DeductiveClosure1 has one interesting property: after any number of iterations
of its outer loop, if Mij = 1 then there must already be a path from i to j in the
initial M .
Lemma 4.3.1 Let Mn be the adjacency matrix after n iterations of the outer loop
of DeductiveClosure1, if Mnij = 1 then there is a path from i to j in M
0.
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on n.
The base case n = 0 is true since M0 is just the initial adjacency matrix.
Let’s assume that the lemma is true for the case n = l − 1 and let k be the literal
selected by the outer loop in the lth iteration. Then, M lij is set to 1 by the l
th
iteration only if M l−1ik = 1 and M
l−1
kj = 1. By the induction assumption, there are
a path from i to k and a path from k to j in M0. By the transitivity, there must
be a path from i to j in M0. Hence, if M lij = 1 then there must be a path from i
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to j in M0. Thus, the lemma holds for the case n = l. From the base step and the
induction step, by the principle of mathematical induction, we can conclude that
the lemma holds for all n.
It is trivial to show that the lemma holds after the completion of DeductiveClosure1.
DeductiveClosure2 also has a similar property for the 0 entries. After any number
of iterations of its outer loop, if Mij = 0 there exists u, v in the initial M such that
there is path from u to i, and a path from j to v, but no path from u to v.
Lemma 4.3.2 Let Mn be the adjacency matrix after n iterations of the outer loop
of DeductiveClosure2, if Mnij = 0 then there exists u, v in M
0 such that M0ui = 1,
M0jv = 1, and M
0
uv = 0.
Proof. The base case k = 0 is true since M0 is just the initial adjacency matrix and
we can have u = i and v = j for each M0ij = 0.
Let’s assume that the lemma is true for the case n = l − 1 and let k be the literal
selected by the outer loop in the lth iteration. Then, M lij is set to 0 by the l
th
iteration only if either (a) M l−1kj = 0∧M l−1ki = 1 or (b) M l−1ik = 0∧M l−1jk = 1. In the
case (a), by the induction assumption, we know that there must exist two literals
u, v where M0uv = 0, M
0
uk = 1, M
0
jv = 1. This means that M
0
ui = 1. In the case (b),
by the induction assumption, we know that there must exist two literals u, v where
M0uv = 0, M
0
ui = 1, M
0
kv = 1. This means that M
0
jv = 1.
Hence, if M lij = 0 then there exists u, v in M
0 such that M0ui = 1, M
0
jv = 1, and
M0uv = 0. Thus, the lemma holds for the case n = l. From the base step and the
induction step, by the principle of mathematical induction, we can conclude that
the lemma holds for all n.
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This lemma also holds after the completion of DeductiveClosure2(M). Let
DC(M) denote the result of calling the procedure of DeductiveClosure1(M) fol-
lowed by DeductiveClosure2(M). The soundness of DC is given by the following
theorem, which says that if implication graph M is correct for some set R of feasible
outputs, then so is DC(M); this implies that both the 0 and 1 entries filled in by
DC are correct for R.
Theorem 4.3.3 For all M and R, if M  α(R), then DC(M)  α(R).
Proof. Suppose DC(M)ij = 1. By the Lemma 4.3.1, there is a path in M : i→ i1 →
... → im → j (m ≥ 0). Therefore, ∀ρ ∈ R, ρ(i) ≤ ρ(i1) ≤ ... ≤ ρ(im) ≤ ρ(j) since
M is correct for R. Hence, DC(M)ij = α(R)ij.
Now suppose DC(M)ij = 0. By the Lemma 4.3.2, there exists u, v in M such that
Muv = 0, Mui = 1, and Mjv = 1. Hence, ∃ρ ∈ R such that ρ(i) ≥ ρ(u) > ρ(v) ≥ ρ(j)
since M is correct for R. Hence, DC(M)ij = α(R)ij.
We moreover conjecture that DC satisfies a completeness property saying that
it fills in as many 1 and 0 entries as can be done without violating soundness.
Nevertheless, we have yet not proved this.
4.4 Computing Implication Graphs Efficiently
Our algorithm for building the implication graph M is shown as Algorithm 3.
Notice that the selection of the ⊥ entry to fill in next is unspecified—our current
implementation does this randomly. Also, DC is invoked each time a new entry
of M is found, to see whether any additional entries can be deduced. However,
DeductiveClosure1 is invoked only if a new 1 entry was found, since otherwise it
cannot possibly deduce anything new. Note also that the else branch corresponds
to an invalid STP query, which gives us a new counterexample to exploit.
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Algorithm 3: Compute the implication graph
input : non-fixed bits IˆN for a set R of feasible outputs
output: implication graph M representing the two-bit patterns
for all i, j ∈ IˆN , Mij ← ⊥;
for all i ∈ IˆN , Mii ← 1, Mi¯i ← 0;
fill in the 0 entries in M determined by random executions and
counterexamples;
while M has an entry with ⊥ do
select p, q ∈ IˆN with Mpq = ⊥;
if STP query reveals that bit p ≤ bit q in R then
Mpq ← 1;
Mq¯p¯ ← 1;
DeductiveClosure1 (M);
DeductiveClosure2 (M);
else
Mpq ← 0;
Mq¯p¯ ← 0;
get counterexample and use it to fill in more 0 entries of M ;
DeductiveClosure2 (M);
To show the correctness of Algorithm 3, note that the initialization of M es-
tablishes M  α(R). Assuming that the STP queries are answered correctly, the
assignments to Mpq and Mq¯p¯ preserve this invariant, as do the calls to DC, by The-
orem 4.3.3. Hence, the algorithm terminates with M = α(R), as desired.
Having calculated the implication graph M , we next compute the size of γ(M) by
extracting the inequalities in M and counting the number of solutions using Math-
ematica’s SatisfiabilityCount function. (Here we first compact the inequalities
by collapsing the strongly connected components of M and taking the transitive
reduction.) Finally, we compute the maximum leakage as log |γ(M)|, since (by The-
orem 4.1.3) the size of γ(M) is an upper bound on the number of feasible outputs.
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4.5 Revisiting the Illustrative Example
We revisit the illustrative example in Figure 3.1 using the optimized approach. The
optimized approach achieves a notable improvement on performance—57% time re-
duction. This is achieved in the same computing environment described in Chapter
3. However, the effectiveness of different techniques varied. On this program, ran-
dom execution can only have very limited benefit, since a randomly-chosen 32-bit
value for X is highly unlikely to be less than or equal to 64. In all the experiments,
at the second line, only the else branch are taken. Therefore, the only output
that has been produced is 1. This is why it filled just 25% of the non-trivial en-
tries in the implication graph. STP counterexamples, on the other hand, contribute
significantly—57% of the non-trivial entries. The two-bit patterns of the outputs in
this case are so simple that there is no transitive structure in them. This prevents
deductive closure from making any contribution.
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CHAPTER 5
EXPERIMENTS
In this chapter, we assess the accuracy and efficiency of our two-bit pattern
approach by trying it on eleven case studies, most of which come from the recent
literature in quantitative information flow analysis. In all the case studies, we assume
that X is the secret input variable, Y is the output variable, and all the variables are
32-bit unsigned integers. For each case study, both the straightforward technique
which determined each two-bit pattern individually through STP queries and the
optimized technique described in Chapter 4 are used to compute the two-bit patterns
of the feasible outputs. 1 Recall that both techniques are doing the same two-bit
pattern analysis, this means that upper bounds on leakage derived from them are
exactly the same. Hence, the differences between them are only on efficiency. Also,
for all the case studies, their channel capacities, measured by Shannon entropy , min-
entropy, or g-leakage coincide since they are deterministic programs. Throughout
this chapter, we use the term capacity refering to all these channel capacities.
5.1 Sanity Check
Consider the “sanity check” program from [NMS09], where Y is influenced by X only
when X is found to be within an acceptable range:
if (X < 16)
Y = base + X;
else
Y = base;
1Because of the randomness in our new techniques, the new timings using the optimized
technique are averages over 10 executions.
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The possible outputs here range from base to base+15, giving a capacity of log 16 =
4 bits.
An interesting property of this program is that the bit patterns of Y’s final value
depend on the initial value of base. For instance, when base is 0x00001000, then
28 bits in Y are fixed: bits 31 through 13 and bits 11 through 4 are Zero, and bit 12
is One. The last 4 bits are Non-fixed, therefore, the one-bit patterns are
0000000000000000000100000000****
The two-bit patterns among the 4 non-fixed bits are all Free. SatisfiabilityCount
computes that there are 16 instances which satisfy all of these bit patterns, giving
a (precisely correct) channel capacity of 4 bits. In terms of efficiency, it takes the
straightforward approach 37 STP queries and 33 ms to compute the one-bit patterns,
24 STP queries and 21 ms to compute the two-bit patterns, and SatisfiabilityCount
requires less than 1 ms. The optimized approach achieves a modest improvement
on performance. The effectiveness of different techniques varied. On this program,
random execution will have little benefit, since a randomly-chosen 32-bit value for
X is highly unlikely to be less than 16—this is why it filled just 25% of the non-
trivial entries in the implication graph. STP counterexamples, on the other hand,
contribute significantly—50% of the non-trivial entries. Finally, the contribution of
deductive closure is zero. When base is 0x00001000, only the rightmost four bits of
Y are non-fixed, and their two-bit patterns are all Free, preventing deductive closure
from deducing anything; hence, we see only a 33% time reduction with this base.
In contrast, when base is 0x7ffffffa, the situation becomes a lot more inter-
esting. The bit patterns in Y are complex, since now the possible outputs range
from 0x7ffffffa to 0x80000009. The possibility of a string of carries leads to
many dependencies among the bits of Y. It takes the straightforward approach 64
STP queries and 66 ms to show that all 32 bits are Non-fixed. And there are many
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interesting two-bit patterns among the 32 · 31/2 = 496 pairs of bits. Namely, bits
30 through 4 are all equal to one another, and different from bit 31. Moreover, bits
30 through 4 are all less than or equal to bit 3. Finally, we have Or(31,3). In total,
we find that 90 pairs have pattern Free, and the remaining 406 pairs have pattern
Eq, Neq, Leq, or Or. Determining these two-bit patterns requires 1552 STP queries
and 2040 ms. Finally, SatisfiabilityCount requires 1 ms to determine that there
are 24 solutions to the bit patterns, implying a capacity of at most log 24 ≈ 4.58
bits, which is close to the actual capacity of 4 bits. Because a large number of
literals are in the equivalance relation, deductive closure is very helpful here, since
it found 36% of the entries. Overall, the optimized approach gains a time reduction
of 90%. In fact, when the random testing and STP counterexamples are disabled,
the contribution of deductive closure becomes the dominating force, finding 93% of
the entries.
5.2 Implicit Flow
Here is a program from [NMS09] that indirectly copies X to Y if X ≤ 6; otherwise, it
sets Y to 0:
Y = 0;
if (X == 0) then Y = 0;
else if (X == 1) then Y = 1;
else if (X == 2) then Y = 2;
...
else if (X == 6) then Y = 6;
else Y = 0;
Since there are 7 possible outputs, the capacity is log 7 ≈ 2.81 bits.
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The straightforward approach is efficient in this case. It only spends 28 ms to
find that the one-bit patterns here are
00000000000000000000000000000***
and the two-bit patterns on the 3 Non-fixed bits are all Free. Hence, there are 8
solutions to the bit patterns, implying a capacity of at most 3 bits. Notice that
two-bit patterns do not capture the fact that 7 is not a possible output here. The
reason is that while the last three bits of Y cannot all be 1, any two of them can be
1.
The optimized approach gains 61% time reduction, a rather modest improve-
ment. As in the case of sanity check, random execution will have little impact, since
a randomly-chosen 32-bit value for X is highly unlikely to be less than or equal to
6. Therefore, random executions almost certainly produce a single output, 0. Nev-
ertheless, this output still helps reducing the number of one-bit pattern queries to
32 and contributes 25% of the non-trivial entries in the implication graph. The rest
of non-trivial entries are filled by only 4 implication queries. Because the two-bit
patterns among the only three non-fixed bits of Y are all Free, deductive closure was
once again prevented from deducing anything.
5.3 Population Count
This program from [NMS09] uses clever bit operations to count the number of bits
in X that are 1, and leaks this count to Y:
X = (X & 0x55555555) + ((X>>1) & 0x55555555);
X = (X & 0x33333333) + ((X>>2) & 0x33333333);
X = (X & 0x0f0f0f0f) + ((X>>4) & 0x0f0f0f0f);
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X = (X & 0x00ff00ff) + ((X>>8) & 0x00ff00ff);
Y = (X + (X>>16)) & 0xffff;
It has 33 possible outputs. Thus, its capacity is log 33 ≈ 5.044 bits.
The straightforward approach uses 38 STP queries and 184 ms to find that the
one-bit patterns are
00000000000000000000000000******
Among the 6 non-fixed bits, we find (using 50 STP queries and 721 ms) that there
are 5 interesting two-bit patterns: Nand(5,4), Nand(5,3), Nand(5,2), Nand(5,1) and
Nand(5,0). These patterns have exactly 33 instances; therefore, our bound is exact.
The optimized approach achieves 80% time reduction. Random execution is
highly effective in this case. It shows that the last 5 bits of Y are non-fixed, and
therefore reduce the one-bit pattern queries from 32 to 27. This turns out to be a
big win in time reduction , since the one-bit pattern queries on the last 5 bits are
more expensive. Random execution also contributes 80% of the non-trivial entries
in the implication graph. The rest of the entries are filled by only a few implication
queries and deductive closure.
5.4 Mix and Duplicate
Next, we revisit the example (also from [NMS09]) discussed in the Introduction. It
combines the two halves of X using XOR, and then duplicates these 16 bits in both
the upper and lower halves of Y:
Y = ((X >> 16) ^ X) & 0xffff;
Y = Y | Y << 16;
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Hence, it has 216 = 65536 possible outputs, giving a capacity of 16 bits.
In 64 STP queries and 23 ms, the straightforward approach finds that all 32 bits
are non-fixed. Then, in 1968 STP queries and 863 ms, it finds that there are 16 Eq
patterns
Eq(31, 15),Eq(30, 14),Eq(29, 13), . . . ,Eq(16, 0)
and 480 Free patterns.
For some reason, SatisfiabilityCount took much longer here than in any other
case—it took 42 ms to determine that there are 65536 solutions to the bit patterns.
We get a capacity of at most log 65536 = 16 bits, which is again exact.
The optimized approach, on the other hand, only spends 82 ms–reduced time
by 91%. The major win came from random execution. The random execution is so
effective that it shows that all the bits are non-fixed. Therefore, no one-bit pattern
querie is needed. It also fills most of the 0 entries in the implication graph.
5.5 Masked Copy
This simple program copies the first 16 bits of X into Y, masking out the last 16 bits:
Y = X & 0xffff0000;
As in the previous example, it has 216 = 65536 possible outputs, giving a capacity
of 16 bits.
In 48 STP queries and 9 ms, the straightforward approach finds that the one-bit
patterns are
****************0000000000000000
In 480 STP queries and 114 ms, it finds that all two-bit patterns are Free. Thus,
we get a min-capacity of 16 bits, which is again exact.
48
In the optimized approach, random execution turns out to be highly effective.
It produces enough feasible outputs which manifest all the non-fixed bits and Free
relations among them. Hence, all of the 0 entries in the implication graph are filled.
Only the rightmost 16 bits are left for one-bit pattern queries to find out that they
have fixed value 0. Thus, it leaves no room for STP counterexample and deductive
closure to make any contribution.
5.6 Binary Search
Now we consider a program that uses binary search to leak the first b bits of X to Y:
Y = 0;
for (i = 0; i < b; i++) {
m = 2^(31-i);
if (Y + m <= X) Y += m;
}
We handle the loop by unrolling it completely, precomputing the value of m at each
iteration. When b = 16, we get the program
Y = 0;
if (Y + 2147483648 <= X) Y += 2147483648;
if (Y + 1073741824 <= X) Y += 1073741824;
if (Y + 536870912 <= X) Y += 536870912;
if (Y + 268435456 <= X) Y += 268435456;
if (Y + 134217728 <= X) Y += 134217728;
if (Y + 67108864 <= X) Y += 67108864;
if (Y + 33554432 <= X) Y += 33554432;
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if (Y + 16777216 <= X) Y += 16777216;
if (Y + 8388608 <= X) Y += 8388608;
if (Y + 4194304 <= X) Y += 4194304;
if (Y + 2097152 <= X) Y += 2097152;
if (Y + 1048576 <= X) Y += 1048576;
if (Y + 524288 <= X) Y += 524288;
if (Y + 262144 <= X) Y += 262144;
if (Y + 131072 <= X) Y += 131072;
if (Y + 65536 <= X) Y += 65536;
As in the previous example, it has 216 = 65536 possible outputs, giving a capacity
of 16 bits.
In 48 STP queries and 246 ms, the straightforward approach finds that the one-
bit patterns are
****************0000000000000000
In 480 STP queries and 4220 ms, it finds that all two-bit patterns are Free. Thus,
we get a capacity of 16 bits, which is again exact.
As in the case of Masked Copy, random execution is highly effective—it usually
finds enough feasible outputs to fill in all of the entries of M . Because STP queries
on this program are very expensive (after all, it has 216 possible execution paths),
avoiding STP queries is very beneficial, since it reduces the analysis time by more
than 99%. The only significant time spending comes from 16 one-bit pattern queries
needed to confirm that the rightmost 16 bits are fixed with the value 0.
5.7 Electronic Purse
Next, we consider the electronic purse program from [BKR09]:
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Y = 0;
while(X >= 5) {
X = X - 5;
Y = Y + 1;
}
Here we add the assumption that X < 20, which means that Y can range from 0 to
3, giving a capacity of 2 bits.
Again we unrolled the loop. The straightforward approach finds (in a total of
272 ms) that the first 30 bits of Y must be 0, and the last 2 bits are Free, giving a
capacity of 2 bits. As in the two previous cases, random execution produces enough
feasible outputs which reveal the non-fixed bits and their Free relations. However,
since one-bit patterns queries dominate the time in both techniques, the overall
improvement is modest–42% time reduction.
5.8 Sum Query
Here is the sum query from [BKR09]:
Y = X1;
Y = Y + X2;
Y = Y + X3;
Here we assume that X1, X2, and X3 are each less than 10. This means that there
are 28 possible outputs (from 0 to 27) and a capacity of log 28 ≈ 4.807 bits.
In a total of 235 ms, the straightforward approach finds that the first 27 bits of
Y must be 0, and the last 5 bits are Free, giving a capacity of log 32 = 5 bits. As
in the case of Electronic Purse, the optimized approach mainly saves the time on
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computing two-bit patterns. However, since one-bit pattern queries dominate the
time in both techniques, the overall gain in time reduction is only 50%.
5.9 Ten Random Outputs
While bit patterns performed quite well in all our previous case studies, we did
identify a scenario where they perform very poorly. Consider a family of programs
that each have exactly ten possible outputs:
if (X == r1) Y = r1;
else if (X == r2) Y = r2;
else if (X == r3) Y = r3;
...
else if (X = r9) Y = r9;
else Y = r10;
Suppose we create such a program by generating distinct 32-bit values r1 through
r10, uniformly and independently. Intuitively, we would expect that the one-bit
patterns for Y will all be Non-fixed, and the two-bit patterns will overwhelmingly be
Free, leading us to greatly overestimate the capacity.
We confirmed this intuition experimentally by creating 20 such programs and
finding the average result of our bit-pattern analysis. On average, the bit patterns
had over 400,000 solutions, giving a capacity of 18.645 bits, which far exceeds the
actual capacity of log 10 ≈ 3.322 bits. While the inaccuracy here is striking, prac-
tical programs would seem unlikely to produce such completely unrelated outputs;
therefore, it is not clear whether this example represents a significant limitation of
two-bit patterns.
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Program Min-capacity Upper bound
Illustrative example 4.087 4.087
Sanity check, base=0x00001000 4. 4.
Sanity check, base=0x7ffffffa 4. 4.585
Implicit flow 2.807 3.
Population count 5.044 5.044
Mix and duplicate 16. 16.
Masked copy 16. 16.
Binary search, b=16 16. 16.
Electronic purse 2. 2.
Sum query 4.807 5.
Ten random outputs (average) 3.322 18.645
Table 5.1: Accuracy of our upper bounds
It is worthwhile to note that STP counterexamples are highly effective in this
case. This is due to the fact that there are only ten feasible outputs. Even one or
two counter examples can fill many entries in the implication graph, and thus, save
STP implication queries. In fact, the optimized approach only needs 67 implica-
tion queries in average to compute the implication graph, while the straightforward
approach needs about 1900 queries on average. The overall time reduction is 94%.
5.10 Summary
We present our results on the case studies in six tables. Table 5.1 compares the
channel capacities with our upper bounds. Table 5.2 shows our times (in millisec-
onds) spent by the straightforward technique to compute one-bit patterns, two-bit
patterns, and to count the number of solutions to the bit patterns.2 Table 5.3
shows the corresponding results obtained by the optimized technique. Table 5.4
presents details of bit-pattern analyses: the number of STP queries required by
2The times reported here for our analysis on the straightforward technique are faster
than those reported in [MS11], because we have redone our old experiments on a faster
computer: a 2.3 GHz Intel Core i3-2310M.
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Program One-bit patterns Two-bit patterns #SAT
Illustrative example 1072 1747 <1
Sanity check, base=0x00001000 33 21 <1
Sanity check, base=0x7ffffffa 66 2040 1
Implicit flow 12 16 <1
Population count 184 721 <1
Mix and duplicate 23 863 42
Masked copy 9 114 <1
Binary search, b=16 246 4220 <1
Electronic purse 210 62 <1
Sum query 135 100 <1
Ten random outputs (average) 91 3460 14
Table 5.2: Times in ms to calculate our bounds using the straightforward technique:
#SAT = times for SatisfiabilityCount
Program
Random
execution
One-bit
patterns
Two-bit
patterns
#SAT
Illustrative example 1 805 398 <1
Sanity check, base=0x00001000 1 28 7 <1
Sanity check, base=0x7ffffffa 2 4 197 < 1
Implicit flow 1 7 3 <1
Population count 4 79 96 <1
Mix and duplicate 2 0 80 < 1
Masked copy 2 2 6 <1
Binary search, b=16 1 21 2 <1
Electronic purse 4 153 0 <1
Sum query 1 113 4 <1
Ten random outputs (average) 1 7 216 < 1
Table 5.3: Times in ms to calculate our bounds using the optimized technique: #SAT
= times for SatisfiabilityCount
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Program 1-bit 2-bit 1-bit* =>
# of
Non-fixed bits
# of
Free pairs
Illustrative example 38 32 30 13 5 6
Sanity check, base=0x00001000 37 24 32 6 4 6
Sanity check, base=0x7ffffffa 64 1552 3 75 32 90
Implicit flow 35 12 32 4 3 3
Population count 38 50 27 6 6 10
Mix and duplicate 64 1968 0 32 32 480
Masked copy 48 480 16 0 16 120
Binary search, b=16 48 480 16 0 16 120
Electronic purse 34 4 30 0 2 1
Sum query 37 40 27 1 5 10
Ten random outputs (average) 64 1843 4 67 32 384
Table 5.4: Details of our bit pattern analyses: 1-bit=the number of one-bit queries
by the straightforward technique, 2-bit=the number of two-bit queries by the
straightforward technique, 1-bit*=the number of one-bit queries by the optimized
technique, =>=the number of implication queries by the optimized technique
both techniques, the number of Non-fixed bits, and the number of Free pairs. Ta-
ble 5.5 compares the times to do two-bit pattern analysis using both techniques. As
can be seen, two-bit patterns usually allow quite accurate bounds to be calculated.
Even the straightforward technique only takes a few seconds to compute two-bit
patterns. The optimized technique based on implication graphs, random execution,
STP counterexamples, and deductive closure allows two-bit pattern analysis to be
done more efficiently. The times are reduced in all 11 case studies, by an average
of 72%; in five cases, the reduction exceeds 90%. However, the reductions are quite
variable, ranging from 33% to over 99%.
One way to understand the varied effectiveness of the different techniques that
we are using is to consider what percentage of the non-trivial entries of the impli-
cation graph M are found by random execution, by STP counterexamples, by STP
queries, and by deductive closure. Table 5.6 gives this information. It shows that
the percentage of entries found by random execution varies greatly, from as little as
25% to as much as 100%. STP counterexamples contribute between 0% and 70%.
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Program OTime NTime Reduction
Illustrative example 2819 1204 57%
Sanity check, base=0x00001000 54 36 33%
Sanity check, base=0x7ffffffa 2106 203 90%
Implicit flow 28 11 61%
Population count 905 179 80%
Mix and duplicate 886 82 91%
Masked copy 123 10 92%
Binary search, b=16 4466 24 99%
Electronic purse 272 157 42%
Sum query 235 118 50%
Ten random outputs (average) 3551 224 94%
Table 5.5: Old and new times in ms to do two-bit pattern analysis: OTime=old
time for two-bit pattern analysis using the straightforward technique, NTime=new
time for two-bit pattern analysis using the optimized technique, Reduction=1 −
NTime/OTime
As for deductive closure, it contributes in only two of the case studies, and this is
mostly a function of the fact that random execution and STP counterexamples often
fill in almost all of M . To see what contribution deductive closure could have made,
we repeated the experiments with random execution and STP counterexamples dis-
abled. As seen in P4*, deductive closure could have made a significant contribution
in five of the case studies.
To further test the optimized approach’s capability of speeding up the perfor-
mance, we contrived the following program:
Y = X;
if ((Y & 0xffff) != 0)
Y = Y | 0xffff0000;
An interesting property of this program is that each of the leftmost 16 bits of Y
is greater than or equal to each of the rightmost 16 bits of Y, and there are no
other constraints. This poses a challenge to the optimized approach due to a great
amount of “arrow” among the bits, 256 in total. However, the optimized approach
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Program P1 P2 P3 P4 P3* P4*
Illustrative example 25 57 18 0 67 33
Sanity check, base=0x00001000 25 50 25 0 100 0
Sanity check, base=0x7ffffffa 25 35 4 36 7 93
Implicit flow 25 58 17 0 100 0
Population count 80 10 10 0 88 12
Mix and duplicate 98 2 0 0 57 43
Masked copy 100 0 0 0 100 0
Binary search, b=16 100 0 0 0 100 0
Electronic purse 100 0 0 0 100 0
Sum query 97 3 0 0 100 0
Ten random outputs (average) 25 70 3 2 53 47
Table 5.6: Average percentage of M found by different techniques: P1=entries found
by random execution, P2=entries found by STP counterexamples, P3=entries found
by STP implication queries, P4=entries found by deductive closure. P3* and P4*
are the same as P3 and P4, but with random execution and STP counterexamples
disabled.
still achieved a modest time reduction. It took the straightforward approach 64
STP queries and 23 ms to compute the one-bit patterns, 1728 STP queries and 809
ms to compute the two-bit patterns, With the help of random executions and STP
counterexamples, the optimized approach only spent one STP and 1 ms to compute
the one-bit patterns, 272 STP queries and 543 ms to build the implication graph.
In fact, random executions and STP counterexamples are so effective in this case
that they largely eliminate the need to determine the Free patterns within both the
leftmost 16 bits and the rightmost 16 bits. As in many previous case studies, the
deductive closure was prevented from contributing anything.
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CHAPTER 6
RELATED WORK
This chapter discusses the relevant literature in fields of contemporary quantita-
tive information flow, constraint solving, and abstract interpretation. These works
are compared with two-bit patterns from both theoretical and implementational
perspectives.
6.1 Calculating Quantitative Information Flow
Calculating quantitative information flow is a challenging problem, as shown for
example by the negative computational complexity results given in [YT10]. The pa-
per shows that the problem of comparing the min-entropy leakage of two loop-free
boolean programs is #P-hard; they give a reduction showing that one can count the
number of satisfying assignments of a boolean proposition (which is #P-complete)
via a polynomial number of such comparison queries. Nevertheless, this is an area
that is now seeing a great deal of work, both in the context of imperative programs
[BKR09, KR10, NMS09, PMTP12, HM10, APvRS10, CCG10] and real world soft-
wares [HM10, KMO12]. Our focus here will be on techniques for calculating channel
capacity under min-entropy and Shannon entropy of deterministic programs.
One work, which is similar to our two-bit patterns, is the paper by Newsome,
McCamant, and Song [NMS09], which estimates Shannon capacity of deterministic
x86 binaries. Interestingly, their motivation is quantitative integrity, looking at the
amount of influence the untrusted input can have on the trusted output. While
they actually use Shannon capacity, by Theorem 2.5.2 above this coincides with
min-capacity, and amounts simply to counting the number of possible output val-
ues. They estimate this through various heuristics, using STP to check whether a
particular output is possible or not, and whether an interval contains any possible
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outputs. Using binary search, they try to find which intervals in the range of Y con-
tain possible outputs and which do not. When they find that an interval contains
at least one possible output, they sometimes use random sampling to estimate the
density of possible outputs within it.
While these techniques often work well, they do poorly on programs like Mix
and Duplicate, whose outputs are sparse and scattered. In that program, interval
analysis gives no useful information, and sampling cannot give accurate estimates,
since it has only 216 possible outputs (out of 232 32-bit integers). For cases like this,
they rely complementarily on a probabilistic #SAT algorithm to estimate directly
the number of possible output values. However, this is expensive, taking up to 30
seconds in some cases.
We believe that our case studies show that two-bit patterns offer a useful in-
termediary for leakage calculation for two reasons. First, two-bit patterns can be
calculated rather quickly and they usually provide quite accurate upper bounds on
the min-capacity. Second, counting the number of solutions to the bit patterns,
using SatisfiabilityCount, seems to be much faster than trying to count the
number of solutions to the whole program model.
A quite different approach to approximating leakage is given in the recent work
of Ko¨pf and Rybalchenko [KR10], which uses statistical sampling to estimate the
mutual-information leakage of a deterministic imperative program from input X to
output Y , under a uniform a priori distribution. While they present the technique
in terms of estimating H(X|Y ), it is easier to remember that the mutual-information
leakage is just H(Y ). They assume that for each possible output value y, we can
estimate its probability (by estimating the number of values of X that lead to y).
Then they observe that H(Y ) is the expected value of log 1
P (y)
, where y is a sampled
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output value:
mutual information leakage = H(Y ) = E
(
log
1
P (y)
)
.
With n samples, y1, y2, . . . yn, we find that H(Y ) is also the expected value of
1
n
∑n
i=1 log
1
P (yi)
. Crucially, the variance of this last random variable is small relative
to the number of possible inputs, which means that the Chebyshev inequality can
be used to give good bounds on the accuracy of the estimate for not-too-large values
of n. However, it is not clear whether a similar technique can be used to calculate
min-entropy leakage.
Another model-checking based work in this area is the recent paper by Heusser
and Malacaria [HM10]. While they actually focus on the Shannon capacity of de-
terministic programs, again this essentially amounts to counting the number of
possible output values. Rather than attempting to calculate the capacity, they in-
stead focus on solving the problem of testing whether the capacity is at least some
threshold. Their approach is to test whether a program P can produce at least b
different outputs by forming a new program P ′ which runs P independently b times
on nondeterministically-chosen inputs. They then check (using the bounded model
checker CBMC) whether there is a path to a state where all b outputs are distinct.
In this way, they determine whether P ’s capacity is at least log b bits. They model
both high inputs, which are confidential, and low inputs, which are controlled by
users. In the particular case of low input, all runs of P in P ′ have varying high
input, but the same low input. Therefore, the model checker essentially determines
whether there exists a value of l under which P ’s capacity is at least log b bits.
While the technique yields interesting results on leakage in real Linux kernel
vulnerabilities, the time taken by this method grows very quickly with b. Based on
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their experimental timings, it seems that one cannot go very much above b = 128;
checking with b = 220 (corresponding to a 20-bit capacity) would appear infeasible.
Abstract interpretation has also been considered as an approach to measure
information leakage in large programs. Ko¨pf, Mauborgne, and Ochoa [KMO12]
develop an abstract interpretation for bounding capacity, and use it to show bounds
on cache leaks in implementations of the AES cryptosystem.
One closely related work on quantitative information flow analysis is the symbolic
quantitative information flow (SQIF) by Phan, Malacaria, Tkachuk, and Pa˘sa˘reanu
[PMTP12]. They also tackle the problem of counting the feasible outputs of a
deterministic program, but with a different strategy. Unlike two-bit patterns which
provide an approximation on the set of feasible states of the output, SQIF essentially
describes precisely all of the feasible program outputs using a tree-based symbolic
representation. For a program P with a k-bit output Y , Y is viewed as a bit vector:
yk−1yk−2..y0. Its feasible states can be represented by a binary tree. The tree has
a root node y0. For every node yi, the left path represents ¬yi, and the right
path represents yi. The succession of the nodes in the tree follows the strict order
of y0 > y2 > ... > yk−1. For example, suppose that the program has 3 feasible
outputs, {000, 100, 110}, where we index the 3 bit positions from 2 down to 0.
These outputs can be represented by the binary tree in Figure 6.1. One obvious
benefit of this representation is that counting the number of feasible outputs becomes
straightforward. It is reduced to counting the number of leaf nodes.
Given a deterministic program with a high input and a low output, its symbolic
representation of the feasible output states can be computed by a recursive method
based on model checking tool like Java Pathfinder (JPF) [JPF]. To illustrate the
technique, let’s revisit the case study of sanity checker in Chapter 5.
base = 8;
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y0
y1
y2
¬y0 ∧ ¬y1 ∧ ¬y2
y2
¬y0 ∧ ¬y1 ∧ y2 ¬y0 ∧ y1 ∧ y2
Figure 6.1: The symbolic representation for {000, 100, 110}
if (X < 16)
Y = base + X;
else
Y = base;
Assuming that all the variables are 32-bit integers, and the variable base has an
initial value 8, Y can only have integer values from 8 to 23. The procedure starts
with the lowest bit y0. To test whether y0 can be true, Java Pathfinder checks the
validity of y0 by using the following assertion:
assert!y0;
In this example, the model checker would return False since all odd values from 9
to 23 are the outputs where y0 is True. The procedure then proceeds recursively,
first on the path of y0 and to the next level with a path condition pc = y0 as the
passing argument. From there, it repeats the same check on pc ∧ y1. For each node
yi, the recursion checks the satisfiability of the right path (yi) first and then the left
path (¬yi). The procedure continues until it hits the deepest level of the tree (the
32th level in this case) or the checking fails. A trace of the state space exploration is
described in Figure 6.2. The procedure takes its progression on the path of successive
right paths, until the 5th level where pc = y0 ∧ y1 ∧ y2 ∧ y3 and the testing on the
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y0
y1
y2
y3
y4
UNSATy0 ∧ y1 ∧ y2 ∧ y3 ∧ ¬y4
y0
y0 ∧ y1
y0 ∧ y1 ∧ y2
y0 ∧ y1 ∧ y2 ∧ y3
Figure 6.2: A SQIF state exploration trace for sanity check program
satisfiability of pc ∧ y4 fails. Hence, it takes on the path of ¬y4; there pc ∧ ¬y4 is
found to be satisfiable. From the 6th level, only the path of ¬yi is satisfiable until
i = 32. A full path to the feasible output 00000000000000000000000000001111 (15)
is found. At the end of the procedure, we have all the feasible outputs from 8 to 23;
which means that the program has a Shannon/Min capacity of 4 bits.
In [PMTP12], they also makes a comparison between SQIF and two-bit patterns
on a few case studies. In the case of ten random outputs, the SQIF triumphs over
our approach:
if (X == r1) Y = r1;
else if (X == r2) Y = r2;
else if (X == r3) Y = r3;
...
else if (X = r9) Y = r9;
else Y = r10;
According to their experimentation report, when r1 to r9 are uniformly distributed,
SQIF always finds exactly 10 outputs in about 1 second. Recall our experiment in
Chapter 5; two-bit pattern analysis takes about 224 milliseconds with a result of
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18.645 bits in average. However, in the case studies which have a large number of
feasible outputs, it is doubtful that SQIF can compute them efficiently.
6.2 Binary Implication Graph
The binary implication graph can be used to facilitate conjunctive normal form
(CNF) simplification. One example of this effort is Marijn J. H. Heule, Matti
Ja¨rvisalo and Armin Biere’s work on efficient CNF simplification based on binary
implication graphs [HJB11]. They introduce an efficient method to “unhide” various
redundancies in a CNF formula using the time stamping information in the binary
implication graphs, derived from the size 2 clauses in the CNF. In particular, they
are interested in hidden literals and hidden tautologies. Hidden literals are the kind
of literals which can be removed from a clause without affecting the set of satisfying
assignments. Hidden tautologies are the kind of clauses which can be removed from
the conjunction without affecting the set of satisfying assignments. Knowing the
implications among the literals can facilitate the detection of these redundancies.
For instance, a literal l in a clause C is a hidden literal, if the implication l → l′
holds and l′ ∈ C. In this context, l is redundant and can be removed from C. A
clause C is a hidden tautology, if the implication l¯ → l′ holds and both l and l′
are in C. C is redundant, since either l or l′ must be true. Consider the following
formula from [HJB11]:
E = (a¯ ∨ c) ∧ (a¯ ∨ d) ∧ (b¯ ∨ d) ∧ (b¯ ∨ e) ∧ (c¯ ∨ f) ∧ (d¯ ∨ f) ∧ (f¯ ∨ h) ∧ (g¯ ∨ f) ∧
(g¯ ∨ h) ∧ (a¯ ∨ e¯ ∨ h) ∧ (b¯ ∨ c¯ ∨ h) ∧ (a ∨ b ∨ c ∨ d ∨ e ∨ f ∨ g ∨ h).
The implicaton graph derived from the size 2 clauses in E, denoted by IG(E), is
presented in Figure 6.3. It has five root nodes (no incoming arcs): a, b, e¯, g, and h¯.
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a b
c d e
f g
h a¯ b¯
c¯ d¯ e¯
f¯ g¯
h¯
Figure 6.3: An implication graph derived from E (reprinted from [HJB11])
The formula has redundant clauses and literals. The clauses (a¯∨ e¯∨h), (g¯∨h), and
(b¯ ∨ c¯ ∨ h) are hidden tautologies. In the last clause, all literals except e and h are
hidden.
The authors use a depth first search (DFS) procedure to associate “time stamps”
to literals (nodes) in IG(E). A “time stamping” for a node v has a discovered time
and a finished time, denoted by dsc(v) and fin(v), respectively. The discovered time
for a literal is the first time it is encountered during search, and the finished time is
the last time it is encountered during search. This “time stamping” procedure is ap-
plied first to each root in IG(E), then to the literals which have not yet been visited.
The result is a forest of DFS trees with discovered-finished intervals, [dsc(v),fin(v)],
attached to each literal as presented in Figure 6.4. Dashed lines here represent im-
plications in IG(E) which are not used to set the time stamps. According to the
“parenthesis theorem”, for two nodes u and v, v is a descendant of u in the DFS
tree if and only if the time stamp interval of u contains the time stamp interval of v.
In otherwords, dsc(v) > dsc(u) and fin(u) > fin(v). Given the time stamps, these
conditions can be verified in constant time.
With these time stamps, both hidden literals and hidden tautologies can be
detected by simple comparison procedures. For instance, a simple comparison among
the literals in the last clause of E can quickly discover that dsc(c) > dsc(a) and fin(c)
< fin(a). This means that a→ c. Hence, a can be removed from the clause. b can
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a : [29, 32] b : [11, 16]
c : [30, 31] d : [14, 15] e : [12, 13]
f : [2, 5] g : [1, 6]
h : [3, 4] a¯ : [22, 23] b¯ : [8, 9]
c¯ : [25 : 26] d¯ : [21, 24] e¯ : [7, 10]
f¯ : [20, 27] g¯ : [18, 19]
h¯ : [17, 28]
Figure 6.4: Stamp times in IG(E) (reprinted from [HJB11])
also be removed from the clause, since dsc(e) > dsc(b) and fin(e) < fin(b). The
time stamps also facilitate the checking of hidden tautologies. (a¯ ∨ e¯ ∨ h) in E,
for instance, can be quickly discovered as a tautology, since the time stamp of h¯
contains the time stamp of a¯, which means that h¯→ a¯.
They also propose an advanced version of DFS time stamping procedure, which
can perform additional simplifications, such as transitive reduction and discovering
equivalence relations among literals on-the-fly during the stamping procedure. Ex-
periments on real-world SAT competition benchmarks show that unhiding based on
time stamping notably improves the SAT solving.
Conceivably, the techniques introduced in the above work could improve the
efficiency of two-bit pattern computing. Instead of fully relying on STP solver,
we can convert the target program into a CNF formula. Then we can use the
time stamping information in the implication graph derived from the size 2 clauses
to cheaply determine many bit patterns. Hence, we may reduce the number of
necessary STP queries.
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6.3 Unit-Two Variable Per Inequality Constraints
Two-bit patterns is strongly similar to Unit-Two Variables Per Inequality (UTVPI)
constraints. A UTVPI constraint takes the form a.x+b.y ≤ d where a, b ∈ {−1, 0, 1}.
The theory of UTVPI has been studied by both decision procedure community and
abstract interpretation community. One abstract domain, which closely resembles
our works on two-bit patterns and the implication graphs, is Mine´’s octagon abstract
domain[Min01]. The octagon domain is a practical representation of invariants of
the form ±x ± y ≤ d , where x and y are numerical variables and d is a numerical
constant. As our work on two-bit patterns, the set of numerical variable V =
{V1, ..., Vn} is also extended into V ′ = {V ′1 , ..., V ′2n} with each variable Vi having both
a positive variable V ′2i−1 representing Vi and a negative variable V
′
2i representing −Vi.
Every constraint over V can be encoded as an equivalent constraint over V ′:
the constraint is represented as
Vi − Vj ≤ c (i 6= j) V ′2i−1 − V ′2j−1 ≤ c , V ′2j − V ′2i ≤ c
Vi + Vj ≤ c (i 6= j) V ′2i−1 − V ′2j ≤ c , V ′2j−1 − V ′2i ≤ c
−Vi − Vj ≤ c (i 6= j) V ′2i − V ′2j−1 ≤ c , V ′2j − V ′2i−1 ≤ c
Vi ≤ c V ′2i−1 − V ′2i ≤ 2c
Vi ≥ c V ′2i − V ′2i−1 ≤ −2c
A set of octagonal constraints C over V ′ can be represented as a potential graph
which is very similar to the implication graph. A potential graph has nodes in V ′.
For each pair of variables (Vi, Vj) ∈ V ′, there is an arc from Vi to Vj with weight c, if
the constraint Vi−Vj ≤ c is in C. The potential graphs can be desribed by difference-
bound matrices(DBMs). Given a set of constraints C over V ′, its corresponding DBM
m is 2N × 2N matrix (N = |V|) with the following definition:
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mij =
 c, if (vj − vi ≤ c) ∈ C∞, otherwise.
Mine´ proposes a normalization algorithm inspired by Floyd-Warshall shortest-path
closure algorithm to compute the strong closure of a given potential graph and
build abstract transfer functions with a cubic time cost. Incorporated into the
famous Astre´e static analyzer, the octagon domain has achieved remarkable success
on proving the safety properties of large critical softwares.
The decision procedure community is also interested in UTVPI constraints from
the satisfiability perspective: whether a given set of UTVPI constraints is satisfiable.
Jaffar, Maher, Stuckey and Yap proposed the first algorithm to decide whether a
conjunction of UTVPI constraints is satisfiable in both real and integer domains
[JMSY94]. The algorithm is based upon the following inference rules:
a.x+ b.y ≤ c − a.x+ b′.z ≤ d
b.y + b′.z ≤ c+ d (TRANSITIVE)
a.x+ b.y ≤ c a.x− b.y ≤ d a ∈ {−1, 1}
a.x ≤ b(c+ d)/2c (TIGHTENING)
Given a set of UTVPI constraints C, the decision procedure incrementally computes
its closure with respect to the inference rules. C is unsatisfiable if and only if its
closure contains a constraint 0 ≤ d, and d < 0. The algorithm takes O(n2m) time,
where n is the number of variables and m is the number of constraints.
The structural similarity between UTVPI and our graph representation of two-
bit patterns demonstrates the potential utility of the techniques introduced above.
For instance, we may conceivably define the abstract interpretation in terms of
implication graphs and their transformations.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
7.1 Conclusion
In this dissertation, we introduced the technique of calculating upper bounds on
channel capacity of deterministic imperative programs through the use of two-bit
patterns. We then introduced the implication graph as a coherent representation
of two-bit patterns and laid its mathematical foundation using the language of ab-
stract interpretation. Furthermore, a hybrid optimized approach based on implica-
tion graphs, random execution, STP counterexamples, and deductive closure was
proposed to allow two-bit pattern analysis to be done more efficiently.
In our case studies of small (but tricky) programs, we found that two-bit patterns
usually allow quite accurate bounds to be calculated in a few seconds even using
the non-optimized approach. The hybrid optimized approach allows two-bit pattern
analysis to be done more efficiently. Experiments show a substantial benefit from
the new techniques, with time reductions averaging 72%, and often exceeding 90%.
7.2 Future Work
In future work, there are several directions to explore. First, we need to show the
completeness of deductive closure. Second, as we scale to complex programs, it is
clear that STP queries (and STP counterexamples) about the entire program will
ultimately become infeasible. For this reason, we are also interested in exploring
the possibility of doing an approximate two-bit pattern analysis as a compositional
abstract interpretation over the domain of implication graphs. Third, in many real
applications, the high input is not the only influence on the observable output.
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The low input, a non-confidential input, is often an intrinsic part of the system’s
functionality. The low input is either provided by users or determined by other
external factors. It, too, influences the output. We would like to determine the
maximum leakage from the high input to the observable output for all the possible
low inputs. Finally, a philosophical study on the origin of undue information flow
is crucial for the future of cyber security. We are interested in understanding why
there is information flow between the variables with conflicting labels (high/low).
7.2.1 Abstract Interpretation
As many senior researchers in the field of formal verification have pointed out, the
two-bit patterns already constitute a bit-level relational abstract domain. It is re-
lational because it is about the relationships among the bits. It is an abstract
domain because two-bit patterns, represented as implication graphs, form a com-
plete lattice. There is already a partial order, denoted by vAM on the set AM
of adjacency matrix representations of implication graphs. Intuitively, M vAM N
means that for each pair of bits, their contraint in M is tighter than the correspond-
ing constraint in N . vAM corresponds to the subset inclusion of concrete states:
M vAM N =⇒ γ(M) ⊆ γ(N). The set AM has the greatest element >AM for
vAM. It is defined as ∀i, j,>AMij = 0. >AM corresponds to the situation where every
pair of bits are in Free relationship. Therefore, >AM represents the whole space of
concrete states. If we extend AM by introducing the smallest element, denoted by
⊥AM, which represents an empty set of the concrete state, we obtain a complete
lattice (AM,vAM,unionsqAM,uAM,>AM,⊥AM) with the following definitions:
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∀M,N, M vAM N def⇐⇒ ∀i, j,Mij ≥ Nij
∀M,N, (M unionsqAM N)ij def= Mij ∧Nij
∀M,N, (M uAM N)ij def= Mij ∨Nij
where M and N are adjacency matrices in AM. The lattice also has the following
definitions with respect to ⊥AM:
∀K], ⊥AM vAM K]
∀K], ⊥AM unionsqAM K] def= K] unionsqAM ⊥AM def= K]
∀K], ⊥AM uAM K] def= K] uAM ⊥AM def= ⊥AM
where K] stands for any element in AM or ⊥AM.
The challenge is how to define the interpretation on the domain. One solution
is to conduct interpretation by using STP solver to find bit patterns for a vector
consisting of the concatenation of all the program variables after each instruction
in a sequential instruction composition. To illustrate this incremental approach, we
use the analysis of the following program to show the transformation of the two-bit
patterns after each instruction step in detail:
X = X & 0x3;
Y = 16*X + X*X;
Assuming that X is the secret input variable, Y is the output variable, and both are
6-bit unsigned integers, the program can produce 4 distinct outputs: 0, 17, 36, 57.
Therefore, the program has a Shannon/min capacity of 2.
After the first instruction, the analysis finds that the first 4 bits of X became
Zero, and all other bits in X and Y are non-fixed. It also finds that all of the two-bit
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patterns are Free. Based on this configuration, the analysis of the second instruction
finds more complex patterns among the bits in Y. Namely, bit 1 is Zero. Bit 2 and
bit 3 are all less than or equal to bit 5. Moreover, bit 3 is less than or equal to bit
0, which is equal to bit 4. Finally, we have Nand(4,2), Nand(0,2), and Nand(3,2).
There are six solutions corresponding to these bit patterns. Hence, the estimated
channel capacity ( under Shannon entropy or min-entropy) is 2.58 bits.
Nevertheless, the two-bit pattern characterization of the feasible intermediate
program states can be overly imprecise. Consider the following program:
Y = X*X;
Y = X*X - Y;
Assuming that X is a 2-bit unsigned integer variable and Y is a 4-bit unsigned integer
variable, then the program results with Y = 0. Hence, there is no leakage in this
program. If we analyze bit patterns in concatenation XY after the first instruction,
they are exactly the same as the patterns in the final value of Y in the previous
program. Further analysis of the second instruction would fail to achieve the correct
result, Y = 0.
One way to improve the precision is to extend the current mathematical frame
for a more powerful abstract domain. Instead of having only one conjunction of two-
bit patterns, we can use multiple disjointed conjunctions of two-bit patterns as the
abstract domain. Such extension will allow more complex relationships among bits
to be expressed. This, of course, will add considerably to the cost of the analysis.
Due to its bit-wise nature, this kind of abstract interpretation is suitable for static
or dynamic analysis for the binary code. One potential application is to detect the
security flaws in the binary implemention by analyzing various information flows.
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7.3 Low Input
The current approach does not distinguish the high input from the low input, either
under control of the users or caused by some external factors. In the presence of low
inputs, counting the number of feasible outputs can badly overestimate the leakage.
As an example, consider the following program:
X = X & 0x0000000f;
L = L & 0xfffffff0;
Y = X | L;
Assuming that X is the secret input variable, L is the low input variable, Y is the
output variable, and all are 32-bit unsigned integers, the program can produce 232
distinct outputs. However, only the last 4 bits of Y are influenced by X.
Therefore, it is desirable to determine the maximum leakage from the high input
to the observable output for all the possible user inputs. One trivial approach is to
try all of the values for the low input and estimate the leakage for each of them.
This, of course, is computationally inefficient. Heusser and Malacaria’s work [HM10]
provides some insights on how to model the leakage with the presence of both high
and low inputs. However, more work is still needed to find the “worst” value of the
low input which corresponds to the maximum leakage.
7.4 The Origin of Undue Information Flow
In addition to the technical improvement on the current bit pattern based code
analysis, it is crucial to have an understanding of the origin of undue information
flow from historical and philosophical perspectives. Contemporary researchers pri-
marily view the information security issue as a logical problem, and are unaware of
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the Cartesian philosophical tradition which we have inherited since the beginning
of computer science. Since Descartes, humans have been viewed as self-enclosing
rational subjects, who relate to the external world as objects through mental rep-
resentations. This rationalism has been pervasive in all modern sciences including
computer science. The majority of scientists believe that reality can be represented
in term of facts and rules.
However, since the 20th century, this Cartesian tradition has been contested by
many continental philosophers. The most profound challenge came from the German
philosopher, Martin Heidegger. As he pointed out, there are ontological differences
between the mode of being in the life world and the Cartesian representational mode
of being. First, human beings do not usually analyze things theoretically, but rather
use them and take them for granted. In everyday life, things are encountered by
human beings as mutually referred equipments in a unified whole. A house refers to
bad weather and to our need to stay dry; the need to stay dry refers to our medical
knowledge; this knowledge refers in turn to our fear of illness. We are woven together
with this referential totality, the world. Second, the concepts of time are different in
these two modes of being. Unlike the chronological time, an infinite series of “nows”
counted by a clock, the time in the human everyday life is continuous. According to
Heidegger, temporality is a unity against which past, present and future stand out,
while remaining essentially interlocked.
When a programmer creates a software, he/she always projects a particular
social reality in the life world onto a discrete and procedural universe of bits. In
this virtual universe, things are uniformized as binaries. The organic relationships
among them are also mechanized in Turing Machines. This immediately put things
in a “vulnerable” state. For any software system which strives to imitate this organic
human social existence, it is difficult to keep all of the elements in the system
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buf[3]...buf[1] buf[0]
buf[7] ... buf[4]
arguments of foo
return address
Stack before calling
foo
Figure 7.1: The stack holds the return address, the arguments, and the local vari-
ables for foo
(variables or other resources) within the same statically defined categories (types).
At some points of the computation, there will be some variables or handlers which
are simultaneously members of different categories. While many of the overlaps
are harmless, some can cause serious security problems, especially when the overlap
occurs at distinct abstraction layers in the system. As an example, consider the
following function foo:
void foo(const char* input) {
char buf[8];
strcpy(buf, input);
}
When this function is called from another function, a series of actions occur at
the system level. First, the calling function pushes the return address, that is the
address of the return statement onto the stack. Then, the called function pushes
zeroes on the stack to store its local variable. Since foo has an character array
buf[8], there will be space for 8 characters allocated. The configuration of the
stack is depicted in Figure 7.1. The call to strcpy is dangerous here. The function
strcpy simply copies characters until it encounters a “0” character in the source
string. Since the argument which is given to the call can be much longer, it can
overwrite the return address in the stack. This vulnerability can be maliciously
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exploits
exploits
exploits
starting address of
the exploits
Stack before calling
foo
Figure 7.2: The stack with overwritten return address
exploited by an adversary to gain the control over the system. The stack with an
an overwritten return address is depicted in Figure 7.2. When the buffer overflow
happens, the original memory location for the return address becomes a member for
two conflicting categories now. It is simultaneously a system parameter and a user
input!
In the future, information flow research needs to move beyond the pure logical
view of computing and be more aware of this ontological difference. The operational
semantics, both in information theory and the enforcement technique, should reflect
the the dynamics of human existence and its historical character.
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